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Chapter 1
Introduction
The world economy has experienced several waves of globalisation in its his-
tory. Each wave led to a growing interdependence among countries through
increasing amounts of foreign trade, cross-border financial flows and migra-
tion. One of the main features of the globalisation at the end of the 20th
century was the rapid increase of foreign direct investment (FDI). Multi-
national enterprises conducted FDI to serve foreign markets or to exploit
differences in production costs among countries.
However, the sharp increase of FDI flows has led to a fierce debate about
the effects of globalisation. This debate takes place in academic circles but
also on the streets all over the world and illustrates the concerns of many
people about the impacts of globalisation.1 The supporters see FDI as an in-
strument to reduce poverty and increase the efficiency of the global economy.
The opponents argue that FDI leads to an even higher interdependence, and
thus to higher risks and more inequality. In particular in the home countries
of the multinationals the question arises, whether FDI leads to job destruc-
tion and higher unemployment.
At the same time, former planned economies in Central and Eastern Eu-
rope (CEE) started transition process towards market economy. Opening
of these countries gave multinational enterprises access to new markets and
1See Fischer (2003) for an overview and discussion of the main topics.
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cheap production opportunities. Consequently, FDI flows to this region have
been continuously growing. The investment flows brought capital, know-how
and contributed substantially to a successful transition. However, in the
last years a growing number of initial investors are leaving the region due
to increasing production costs, while the total amount of FDI inflows is still
increasing.2
The topic of this thesis is the analysis of foreign direct investments in
transition countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The two main questions
that will be addressed are:
1. What are the impacts of FDI flows on the host and the home countries
of multinational enterprises?
2. How does the pattern of investment flows change over time?
In particular, we will concentrate on the difference between market seek-
ing and cost driven FDI. We will investigate the differences in impacts on the
home and host country between these two types of investment. Furthermore
we will explore how the share of market seeking and cost driven FDI on total
FDI flows into a transition country changes over time.
As a starting point for the analysis, the introduction gives a brief defi-
nition and recent trends of FDI, describes the distinctiveness of transition
countries, introduces the unique data set used in this thesis and gives an
outlook on the structure and the contributions of this thesis.
2See Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (2002) for CEE countries and The Economist
(2003) for detailed discussion of similar examples in Mexico.
2
1.1 Foreign Direct Investments: Definitions
and Recent Trends
Before we present some data on FDI flows it will be useful to define the term
foreign direct investment and its major types. As illustrated in Figure 1.1,
FDI is one of the three components of international capital flows, besides the
portfolio investment and other flows like bank loans. The formal definition of
FDI makes clear the difference to the other two: “Foreign direct investment
reflects the objective of obtaining a lasting interest by a resident entity in one
economy (“direct investor”) in an entity resident in an economy other then
that of the investor (“direct investment enterprise”). The lasting interest
implies the existence of a long-term relationship between the direct investor
and a significant degree of influence on the management of the enterprise.”
(IMF, 1993 and OECD, 1996). “Significant degree of influence” and “long
term relationship” are the key terms to distinguish FDI from portfolio invest-
ments, which are short term activities undertaken by institutional investors
through the equity market. A “lasting interest” in foreign entity emphasises
the difference to other forms of capital flows and occurs in form of know-how
or management-skills transfer.3 Since a firm becomes multinational by set-
ting up foreign affiliates, the term “multinational enterprise” can be used as
synonym for foreign direct investment.
There are two main reasons for firms to go multinational: to serve a for-
eign market and to get lower cost inputs. This distinction is used to differ-
entiate between two main types of FDI: horizontal and vertical. Horizontal
FDI refers to the foreign manufacturing of products and services roughly
similar to those the firm produces in its home market. This type of FDI is
called “horizontal” because the multinational duplicates the same activities
in different countries. Horizontal FDI arises because it is too costly to serve
the foreign market by exports due to transportation costs or trade barriers.
3For discussion of FDI concepts see Lipsey (2003).
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Cross Border
Capital Flows
Foreign Direct
Investment
Portfolio 
Investment
Other
Vertical Horizontal
Backward
oriented
Forward
oriented
Figure 1.1: Structure of International Capital Flows
Vertical FDI refers to those multinationals that fragment production pro-
cess geographically. It is called “vertical” because MNE separates the pro-
duction chain vertically by outsourcing some production stages abroad. The
basic idea behind the analysis of this type of FDI is that a production pro-
cess consists of multiple stages with different input requirements. If input
prices varies across countries, it becomes profitable for the firm to split the
production chain.
Furthermore, as shown in Figure 1.1, vertical FDI consists of two groups:
backward and forward vertical FDI.4 In case of backward FDI multinational
enterprise establishes its own supplier of input goods which delivers inputs to
the parent company. Conducting forward FDI, the firm builds up a foreign
4Head (2002).
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Table 1.1: Worldwide FDI and Selected Economic Indicators
Value at current prices Annual Growth Rate
1982 1990 2001 1986-90 1991-95 1996-01
Billions of USD in Percent
FDI Inflows 59 203 735 23.6 20.0 40.1
FDI Outflows 28 233 621 24.3 15.8 36.7
GDP 10,805 21,672 31,900 11.5 6.5 1.2
Total Exports 2,081 4,375 7,430 15.8 8.7 4.2
Source: UNCTAD (2002).
Note: FDI Inflows and Outflows statistics may differ due to differences in computation.
affiliate, which draws inputs from the parent company for own production,
thus staying after the parent in the production chain. A detailed description
of different types of FDI is given in Chapter 2.
Now we turn to the recent trends in foreign direct investments. The last
10 years have seen an enormous increase in volume and importance of cross
border investment flows. FDI flows have grown much faster than trade or
income of host countries, as Table 1.1 illustrates. In the second half of the
1990s, world-wide nominal GDP increased at an annual rate of 1.2 percent
and world exports by 4.2 percent, while world-wide nominal flows of FDI
grew by 40.1 percent. About 70 percent of these flows took place between
advanced industrialised countries. However, the share of Central and East-
ern European (CEE) transition countries significantly increased during the
1990s. In this period of time FDI flows to CEE rose from 0.1 to 3.7 percent
of total FDI flows worldwide.5 In absolute terms this is an increase from 476
Millions USD in 1990 to 28.7 Billion in 2001. Even in 2001 FDI inflows to
CEE continued to grow despite a drop by 50 percent in FDI flows worldwide.
5UNCTAD (2002).
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However, as illustrated in Table 1.2 there are wide differences among
the CEE countries. While Central European countries attracted the largest
share of investment flows, most CIS countries experienced only low inflows
of FDI. The Czech Republic, Hungary and Estonia received twice as much
FDI inflows per capita than other accession countries and three to four times
more than other CEE countries. The three largest recipients of cumulated
flows account for more than 50 percent of all FDI inflows since 1990. As
a consequence of the large FDI inflows, foreign investors play a substantial
role in transition countries. Foreign owned enterprises account for 25 percent
of employment and more than 50 percent of total assets in the advanced
accession countries.6
On the investors side, Germany is the largest investor with 19 percent
on all FDI inflows into Central and Eastern Europe in 2001.7 In the Czech
Republic and Hungary, the share of German FDI achieves 30 percent on the
total FDI stock till 1999.
1.2 The Special Case of Transition Countries
What makes transition countries special for the analysis of vertical and hor-
izontal FDI?
Transition countries emerged in the former planned economies, as they
left planning system towards a market economy. Several theories try to ex-
plain this process,8 and a growing part of the literature focuses on transition
countries as host countries of FDI.9 For the analysis of vertical and horizontal
FDI their are of interest for several reasons.
First, transition countries possess simultaneously characteristics typical
6See Hunya (2002) and Chapters 3 and 5 for more empirical evidence.
7Deutsche Bundesbank (2003) and UNCTAD (2000). See Protsenko and Vincentz
(1999) for discussion of different aspects of German FDI in CEE.
8For general treatment of transition economies see Roland (2000).
9See Mayer (1998) for a survey.
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for both, developed and developing economies.10 This is in particular impor-
tant for the analysis of vertical and horizontal FDI, since the first is usually
observed in developing while the latter in industrialised countries.11 The
second reason is the fast development of transition economy compared to
developing or industrialised countries: in a relatively short period of time,
a transition country undergoes substantial changes of main economic and
political characteristics. Exploring the impact of changing economic envi-
ronment on investment flows allows a better insight into the mechanism of
FDI patterns. Third, Central and Eastern European countries are in particu-
lar important for the analysis of vertical FDI because they feature all major
conditions necessary for this type of FDI: cheap and well educated labour
force and proximity to large markets of Western Europe.12
Finally, FDI has a strong impact on the host transition countries. From
the perspective of the host country, foreign direct investments are widely
seen as one of the main driving forces for successful transition to market
economy.13 FDI brings capital, new technology and managerial know-how
and thus increase the competitiveness of the host economy. As mentioned
above, foreign owned firms are the largest employers and builders of capital
stock in the most of the advanced transition countries. This strong presence
of FDI allows for the analysis of impacts of foreign investments on a host
country.14
In sum, the transition countries of Central and Eastern Europe offer a
unique opportunity for the exploration of vertical and horizontal FDI flows
and their impacts on the host economies.
10Gros und Suhrcke (2000).
11Brainard and Riker (1993) and Markusen (1995).
12See Chapter 2 for detailed discussion of conditions necessary for the appearance of
vertical FDI.
13Kaminsky and Riboud (2000) and Blomstro¨m and Kokko (2003).
14See Chapter 5 for detailed discussion.
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1.3 Survey of German FDI in Eastern Europe
One of the main shortcomings when studying vertical and horizontal FDI has
been the lack of empirical data, since official statistics do not differentiate
between these types of FDI. Therefore, the empirical part of the thesis is
based on a recent survey of German foreign direct investments in Central
and Eastern Europe.
The survey was conducted by the Chair for International Economics at
the University of Munich and has been funded by the German Science Foun-
dation (DFG) and by the Volkswagen Foundation.15 For this purpose the
author and his colleagues carried out personal interviews with top managers
of 461 German investors and collected information about 1,198 investment
projects that have been conducted in Central and Eastern Europe during the
period from 1989 to 2001.16
The surveyed firms have been selected according to the criteria of Deutsche
Bundesbank (2001): an investor must hold at least a 20 percent share in a
foreign company and investment volume per affiliate must exceed 1 million
DEM. An exception was made for service providers with the minimum in-
vestment level of 500 thousand DEM. Thus, the data set is comparable to
the official statistic, as there are no further restrictions on the firm selection.
Total amount of recorded FDI in the survey is 21 billion DEM, which is about
43,7 percent of German FDI in this region in 1999. Measured by other cri-
teria like employment with CEE affiliates the representativity succeeds the
level of 58 percent, since the surveyed firms employ 12 million persons in
Germany and 0.46 million in Central and Eastern Europe. Thus, the data
set is highly representative for German investments in this region.
15German Science Foundation, Grants Prof. Dr. Marin, MA 1823/2-1,-2,-3 and Volk-
swagen Foundation, Grants Prof. Dr. Marin AZ II/76 944 and AZ II/79351.
16Chapters 3 and 4 employ a smaller data set with 1,050 observations because the full
data set was not yet available in electronic form at this stage.
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The data set contains information on the German investor, its foreign af-
filiate, motivation for investment and on the relationship between the parent
firm and its affiliates. This relationship is described by technology trans-
fer, input-output relationship and decision competency. For each firm the
sample includes key indicators like sales, number of employees and balance
sheet. In addition, investing firm is described by industry, employed technol-
ogy, organisational structure and competitive environment. The sample is a
cross-section data set, with all numbers from the last available year.
In contrast to previous surveys and official statistics the data set includes
information on intra-firm trade between parent company and affiliates in
CEE. This information allows to differentiate between vertical and horizon-
tal FDI and conduct the empirical analysis for each type of FDI separately.
1.4 Contributions of the Thesis: Interaction
and Impacts of Vertical and Horizontal
FDI
This thesis contributes to the existing theoretical and empirical literature
on foreign direct investment in several ways. It provides the first empirical
differentiation between vertical and horizontal FDI with firm level data, ex-
plores the interaction between the two types of investments and describes
the impacts of different types of FDI on host and home country.
As a starting point, Chapter 2 summarises the existing theoretical and
empirical literature on vertical and horizontal FDI. In addition, it discusses
different ways of defining vertical and horizontal FDI and presents closely
related terms used in the literature on multinational activity.
Chapter 3 examines the composition of investment flows into a transition
country during the catching-up process. The chapter documents that there
10
is a “FDI Life Cycle” in the way that the share of vertical FDI in total FDI
inflows to a host country falls over time, while the share of horizontal FDI
increases. To explain this pattern Chapter 3 develops a partial equilibrium
model which has closed form solutions.17 The model illustrates how FDI
flows affect host country characteristics, which in turn influence the compo-
sition of investment flows. Thus, it explains the interaction between vertical
and horizontal FDI, while the recent literature has analysed the appearance
of the two types of FDI separately. In a second step, Chapter 3 provides
empirical evidence for the idea of a “FDI Life Cycle” by looking at the time
pattern of vertical and horizontal FDI in transition countries of Central and
Eastern Europe. The empirical analysis distinguishes for the first time be-
tween different types of foreign direct investment to a particular host country.
Both Chapters 4 and 5 examine the impacts of vertical and horizontal FDI
on host and home countries. Chapter 4 explores how vertical and horizon-
tal FDI affect employment of multinational enterprises in different locations.
The main focus is on the interaction between parent company and its ver-
tical and horizontal affiliates. Chapter 4 develops a small theoretical model
that illustrates cross border labour demand for vertical and horizontal multi-
national enterprises. Then, the cross border labour demand is empirically
estimated for each type of FDI separately. The empirical evidence clearly
demonstrates the importance of differentiating between vertical and horizon-
tal FDI when studying the employment effects of FDI: Horizontal affiliates
have no cross border interdependency in their labour demand, while vertical
affiliates are mutually dependent. Thus, this is a contribution to the prior
empirical studies, which only explored home country effects of FDI flows as a
whole. Furthermore, Chapter 4 compares in detail three different procedures
to distinguish vertical and horizontal FDI empirically, using firm level data
on intra-firm trade and the geography of affiliate sales.
17The model of Markusen et al. (1996) which incorporates both types of FDI can only
be solved by computer simulations.
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Chapter 5 further explores the effects of vertical and horizontal FDI on
host economies, concentrating on the Czech Republic as one of the largest
recipients of FDI in Central and Eastern Europe. The main focus is on tech-
nology spillovers from foreign affiliates to local firms in the manufacturing
sector. The contribution of this chapter is to distinguish between the tech-
nology spillovers from different types of FDI. It shows that spillovers from
vertical and horizontal FDI affect local firms in different ways. In particular,
Chapter 5 provides empirical evidence that vertical export oriented FDI has
positive effects on the productivity of local firms, while horizontal FDI has a
negative impact. This difference in impacts is a possible explanation for the
contradictory findings of previous literature on technology spillovers. Over-
all, the results from Chapters 4 and 5 show that the approach of the previous
literature to analyse the impacts of FDI flows as a whole masks important
differences in the impact of different types of foreign direct investments.
Finally, Chapter 6 summarises the results and concludes.
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Chapter 2
Vertical and Horizontal FDI:
Theories and Empirical
Evidence
As a starting point for further analysis, this chapter provides an overview of
the theories of vertical and horizontal FDI that have been accumulated so
far. In order to do so we will look at definitions, intuition, previous literature
and implications of each type of FDI. Finally the empirical findings will be
discussed. The literature on FDI and multinational firms in general is well
documented and is not the focus of this chapter.1
2.1 Theoretical Background
The development of theories of the multinational enterprise occurred in three
stages. The first models of multinational firms emerged from the traditional
literature on international trade with competitive, constant-return models.
Early analysis viewed multinational activities as a part of the theory of capi-
tal flows (Caves, 1971). This theory generated clear results that headquarter
activities should be placed in capital-abundant countries with subsidiaries in
1See Dunning (1977, 1981) and Caves (1996) for theories of the multinational firm.
13
capital-scarce countries. Thus, there was no motive for FDI to occur between
identical countries. This was in contrast to empirical observations and led
in the next stage to the “new trade theory”, which incorporated the idea of
increasing returns to scale and imperfect competition to the traditional mod-
els. Subsequently, the theory of the multinational enterprise was split into
two parts. In the first, the theory of “vertical” FDI emerges, when the firm
geographically separates the stages of production. It builds on the theory of
capital flows, where direct investment was essentially a foreign production
branch. The other strand consists of “horizontal” FDI models, where the
firm produces the same goods or services in different locations. In the third
stage the new models tried to combine the two branches. The respective the-
ory was called the “Knowledge Capital” model (KC). Before moving to the
results of the mentioned models, it is helpful to introduce the most prominent
definitions for vertical and horizontal FDI used in the literature.
Four main definitions of vertical and horizontal FDI have been used in
the previous literature. The first definition is based on the motivation of
investment. Here, FDI is classified to be vertical or horizontal depending
on the motive for affiliate operations. Thus, vertical FDI is conducted in
order to benefit from factor price differences between countries (Hanson et
al., 2003). The second way to discriminate between the two types of FDI
was proposed by Brainard (1993a), who uses the term “factor proportion”
in order to explain foreign activities of MNE. This methodology is derived
from the empirical estimation of international trade flows. The third defi-
nition employs the geographical distribution of sales of the foreign affiliate
(Brainard, 1993b, 1997, and Lankes and Venables, 1997). Finally, Markusen
(1995) defines vertical FDI as a geographical separation of the production
process by stages, which is very similar to fragmentation.2 The present the-
sis uses the common feature of these alternative definitions and speaks of
2Chapter 4 relies on these alternatives and proposes several ways to differentiate em-
pirically between vertical and horizontal FDI.
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vertical FDI as a geographical separation of production while horizontal FDI
is mentioned when the multinational enterprise duplicates the same activity
in different countries.
Indeed, a clear separation between horizontal and vertical FDI is not
possible, because in case of horizontal FDI affiliates draw some headquarter
services from the parent company, even when the firm duplicates the same
production activity in several countries. Thus, each horizontal MNE has
some vertical traits.3
Closely related to the term vertical FDI is the literature on outsourc-
ing and fragmentation. These terms are more general and include often the
geographical separation of production that takes place outside the firm. Fur-
thermore, different prominent researchers refer to geographical separation
of production in different ways. Feenstra (1998) calls it “disintegration of
production”, Krugman (1996) prefers “slicing the value chain” and Leaner
(1996) refers to it as “delocalisation”.
Another term related to vertical multinational activities is “export plat-
form FDI”, which has gained attention in recent studies. It is defined as
production in a host country, with the output sold to a third market and
not in the parent or local market. Thus, such a definition incorporates the
features of vertical and of horizontal FDI as well. Here the foreign affiliate
serves a large integrated market as a horizontal investment. But at the same
time the location within the region is chosen on the basis of cost consider-
ations, which is typical for vertical FDI (Ekholm et. al., 2003). However,
empirical findings by Hanson et al. (2001) suggest a more closer relation-
ship to vertical FDI, since this type of investment is strongly cost driven and
depends negatively on the size of the foreign market.
3This could explain the emergence of theories of vertical and horizontal FDI from the
same source of Heckscher-Ohlin model, where Helpman (1984) explains the existence of
vertical FDI and Markusen (1984) uses a similar approach with several foreign affiliates
to show the existence of horizontal FDI.
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2.1.1 Horizontal FDI
Horizontal multinationals are firms that produce the same good or services
in multiple plants in different countries, where each plant serves the local
market from the local production. Two factors are important for the ap-
pearance of horizontal FDI: presence of positive trade costs and firm-level
scale economies. The main motivation for horizontal FDI is to avoid trans-
portation costs or to get access to a foreign market which can only be served
locally.4 The horizontal models predict that multinational activities can arise
between similar countries.
The intuition behind horizontal FDI is best described in form of an equa-
tion with costs on the one side and benefits on the other side. Establishing a
foreign production instead of serving the market by exports means additional
costs of dealing with a new country. Moreover, there are production costs,
both fixed and variable, depending on factor prices and technology. The
plant-level economies of scales will increase the costs of establishing foreign
plants. On the other side of the equation, there are cost savings by switching
from exports to local production. The most obvious are transport costs and
tariffs. Additional benefits arise from the proximity to the market, as shorter
delivery and quicker response to the market becomes easier. Thus, if benefits
outweigh the costs a multinational enterprise will conduct a horizontal FDI.
The models of horizontal FDI predict, that given the existence of trade
costs and economies of scale at plant and firm level, investment flows can
arise between similar countries (see Table 2.1).5 In order to explain the intu-
ition behind the models we look at the counter-example with two countries
4This is very similar but not identical to high transportation costs, since there are many
other obstacles for exports, for example legal requirements in the insurance sector.
5Firm-level economies of scale appear due to some common input such as R&D that can
be spread among any number of production facilities without losses. Plant-level economies
of scale occur when concentrating the production in one plant lowers the unit costs.
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which are different in either size or in relative factor endowments. In both
situations we assume moderate transportation costs. In the first case, the
appearance of horizontal multinationals is unlikely, because they will have a
disadvantage relative to the national firm with headquarter and production
plant in the larger country. The multinational has to bear fixed costs for
the plant in the smaller market, while the national firm in the larger country
faces trade costs for the small amount of exports to the smaller country. In
the second case the countries are similar in size but different in factor endow-
ments. The horizontal multinational has a disadvantage again, since it places
the production in both countries, also in the more expensive, factor-scarce
country. The national firm located in the country which is factor-abundant
(for example with labour force) conducts the complete production in the
low cost country. The presence of transportation costs is thereby important,
since otherwise the foreign markets will be served by exports and the firm
uses only the scale effects by setting the complete production in one plant.
Theoretical models of horizontal FDI are based on the trade-off between
additional fixed costs from setting up a new plant and the saving of variable
costs from avoiding tariffs and transportation. One of the earliest models
on horizontal FDI is Markusen (1984) with firm-level scale economies as a
driving force. A two-plant firm has fixed costs that are less than double the
ones of a single plant firm, thus creating a motivation for multi-plant pro-
duction. Extensions and refinements of this model can be found in Horstman
and Markusen (1987, 1992). Markusen (1995) provides a discussion on hor-
izontal MNE as an alternative to trade and local firms and discusses the
internalisation problem. A survey of literature and an overview of empirical
finding can be found in Markusen and Maskus (2001).
In a more general model Brainard (1993) discusses the role of scale effects
at the firm and plant level in relation to transportation costs. The intuition is
that horizontal FDI appears as an alternative to exports, if the trade costs are
larger than the fixed costs from establishing a new plant, which is also known
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under the term “proximity-concentration approach”. The driving force here
is the trade-off between the advantages of being near to the market to avoid
transportation costs (proximity) and scale effects in case of production in
one plant (concentration). Scale effects occur because of fixed costs when
building a new plant. The model predicts two situations when horizontal
FDI will dominate over exports or crowd them out completely. The first is
when the transportation costs are large in comparison to the plant fixed costs,
while the second occurs when firm-level scale effects are larger than plant-
level scale effects. This means that the incentive for horizontal multinationals
increases the greater are transport costs relative to fixed plant costs and the
greater are increasing returns at the firm level relative to the plant level.
Further developments of the horizontal model were conducted by Markusen
and Venables (1998, 2000). Markusen and Venables (1998) extended the
aforementioned models to a full multi-country framework, allowing for the
mix of multinational and local firms in each country. In the former, multina-
tionals dominate in countries that are similar in size, factor and technology
endowments. In the latter, the authors show that dissimilarity in relative
factor endowments reduce the horizontal activity of MNE.
Table 2.1 summarizes the conditions necessary for the appearance of hor-
izontal multinationals: countries similar in size and factor endowments, pres-
ence of transportation costs and economies of scale at the firm level.
The findings from the models of horizontal FDI can explain a variety of
features of FDI flows. First, horizontal FDI reduces trade flows, since the
market is served through local production instead of exports. Second, hor-
izontal FDI takes place if the costs of importing are high relative to costs
of investing. Third, horizontal FDI is more likely to occur in large foreign
markets, which allows to spread fixed costs for the new plant over a large
volume of production. Finally, the value of local production may exceed the
simple calculation of net costs from the described trade-off, when establishing
a local production plant may have a strategic value. Given an oligopolistic
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Table 2.1: Conditions for the Existence of Vertical and Horizontal FDI
Vertical and Horizontal FDI exist if Vertical Horizontal
Country characteristics:
Absolute market size small large
Relative Market Size - similar
Relative factor endowment different similar
Trade costs/barriers low moderate/high
Tariff barriers low high
Economies of scale:
Firm level - large
Plant level - low
market, sales of each firm depend on the marginal costs of all other competi-
tors. By conducting horizontal FDI the firm reduces its marginal costs, what
may induce the other firms to reduce their sales. Setting up a new plant is
also a commitment to supply the local market, and this commitment may
change the behaviour of competitors.
2.1.2 Vertical FDI
Vertical FDI takes place if the MNE geographically fragments its produc-
tion by stages. The fragmentation of production occurs in order to exploit
differences in relative factor costs. It is call vertical since the production
stages in different countries are conducted one after another. The modelling
of this type of FDI is based on the idea, that different parts of the production
process have different input requirements. Since the input prices vary across
countries it becomes profitable to split production, conducting for example
labour intensive production stages in countries with low labour costs.
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Similar to the intuition of the horizontal models, the decision to conduct
vertical FDI can be described as a trade-off between costs and benefits. The
benefits arise from the lower production costs in the new location. The pro-
duction chain consists of several stages, often with different factors required
for each stage. A difference in factor prices makes it then profitable to shift
particular stages to the countries, where this factor is relatively cheaper.
This is only profitable as long as the costs of fragmentation are lower than
the cost savings. The costs of splitting the production process emerge in
form of transportation costs, additional costs for acting in a new country, or
of having different parts of production in different countries.
The theoretical modelling of vertical FDI was typically driven by differ-
ences in factor endowments. Models of this sort of FDI date back to the stud-
ies by Helpman (1984, 1985) and Helpman and Krugman (1985). The initial
studies explain the expansion across borders in terms of factor proportion dif-
ferences, where the firm´s headquarter is geographically separated from the
production. These models were based on the extended Heckscher-Ohlin trade
theory with two factors of production and two sectors, one perfectly compet-
itive with constant returns to scale and the other producing differentiated
products under increasing returns to scale. In the former, Helpman (1984)
explains the appearance of vertically separated production by cost savings for
MNE, if it separates the high-skilled labour intensive headquarter activities
and low-skilled labour intensive production activities. These two activities
have different factor intensities and can be split geographically. The model
was constructed with no tariffs and transportation costs so that the firm will
open only one foreign plant.6 The driving force of the model was the absence
of Factor-Price-Equalisation (FPE). If otherwise the difference in relative
endowments of countries is not sufficiently large, trade in goods will lead to
the equalisation of factor prices between countries. Then, there will be no
6This is the main difference to the modelling of horizontal FDI conducted by Markusen
(1985).
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incentive for the firm to separate headquarter and production activities and
FDI will not occur. If, however, the difference in relative factor endowments
is large, one country for example has a much higher endowment of labour
relative to capital, then trade does not equalize factor prices. Here it is prof-
itable for the firm to split activities, locating the labour-intensive part of
production (e.g. assembling) in the labour-abundant country. Consequently,
vertical FDI arises if this separation occurs by setting up an own affiliate.
Thus, the focus of Helpman (1984) was to show that multinational firms have
an incentive to fragment the production geographically and this separation
arises only if the countries differ sufficiently in relative factor endowments.
The literature on vertical FDI is closely related to the models of out-
sourcing, where the vertical separation of production occurs without multi-
nationals. Vertical FDI can be seen as a subset of this fragmentation, since
parts of the production chain are also conducted abroad but by other firms.7
Recent studies analyse the decision of MNE between outsourcing and FDI.
Grossman and Helpman (2002) explore the choice between outsourcing and
integration through FDI as a trade-off between incomplete contracts in arm´s
length relationship versus less-efficient integration within a multinational en-
terprise. While Antra`s and Helpman (2003) show how the productivity of
the firm affects the decision to source the inputs from external suppliers or
from the firm´s own affiliate abroad.
The implications of vertical FDI have not gained much attention so far.
The literature mentions only the impact on international trade flows, as for
example Markusen et al., (1996) and Markusen and Venables (2000). Vertical
FDI is seen to be trade creating, since products at different stages are shipped
between different locations.8 On the other hand, trade costs have a negative
impact on the location of vertical FDI (Shatz and Venables, 2000), making for
example the Central and Eastern European countries especially interesting
7See for example Deardorff (2001) and Feenstra (1998).
8See Yi (2003).
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for this sort of FDI from Western Industrialised countries. At the same time
Zhang and Markusen (1999) argue that the size of the host market has a
negative impact on vertical FDI because the fixed costs for the new plant
can be sooner covered in a larger market.
Table (2.1) summarizes the criteria necessary for the appearance of ver-
tical FDI. It can be seen that differences between country characteristics are
the driving force for this type of FDI. Finally, trade costs and tariff barriers
must be low in order to make the separation more valuable.
2.1.3 Knowledge Capital Model
The theoretical literature described so far contains mostly separate theories
of MNE, concentrating on either vertical or horizontal FDI. In an attempt
to combine the approaches of vertical and horizontal FDI, Markusen et al.
(1996) and Markusen (1997) develop the “Knowledge Capital” model. It
nests in one model factor costs and market access as the driving forces for
vertical and horizontal FDI. Thus, depending on country characteristics both
types of FDI can arise endogenously within the single model. It is called
“Knowledge Capital” (KC) model because knowledge is geographically mo-
bile and serves as a joint input to multiple production plants, independent
of the type of FDI.
The KC-model consists of three firm types within a two-good, two-factor
and two-country framework. One type is horizontal MNE, which duplicates
the same activity in the foreign country. The second type is vertical FDI,
which fragments the production chain and locates the high-skilled labour in-
tensive headquarter in the high-skilled labour abundant home country and
the low-skilled labour intensive production in the low-skilled labour abun-
dant host country. The third type are firms from the home country which
serve the foreign market by exports. The main results are illustrated in Fig-
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ure 2.1.9 Figure 2.1 is an Edgeworth-box with country endowments of skilled
and unskilled labour on the vertical and horizontal axis respectively. The ori-
gin of the home country is in the South-West corner and of the host country
in the North-East corner.10 In this situation, vertical FDI is dominating if
the countries have different endowments. Thus, we see vertical FDI in both
corners. If, in contrast, the countries are very similar, there is no incentive
to fragment the production chain so there is no vertical FDI. At the same
time, in the presence of transportation costs it is more attractive to set up
a local horizontal affiliate instead of serving the market by exports. Thus,
in the middle field there is only horizontal FDI. The white area in between
illustrates the mixed presence of multinationals and firms serving the foreign
markets by exports. Overall, these results are consistent with the previously
described models of vertical and horizontal FDI.
Since the KC-model combines already known results for vertical and hor-
izontal FDI, it has the same implications described in the previous sections.
The solution of the model by simulation does not allow for a broad analysis of
FDI effects, however, it serves as a basis for empirical studies of multinational
activities. In the theoretical literature this framework was used by Zhang and
Markusen (1999) to explore the effect of the market size on FDI. Markusen
(1997) argues with help of the KC-framework that trade and investment lib-
eralisation have different impacts on the host country. For empirical studies,
the simulations results of the KC-model generate testable implications, re-
lating different types of multinational activities to country characteristics.
These empirical finding are presented in the next section.
Again, the results of the KC-model are summarised in the Table 2.1:
Horizontal FDI takes place between large, similar countries, whereas verti-
cal FDI arises between a high-cost country and a low-cost country. Trade
9See Markusen (1997) and Markusen et al. (1997) for the formal algebraic description.
10The picture is showing the simulation for medium transportation costs.
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Figure 2.1: Vertical and Horizontal FDI in the KC-model
costs make horizontal FDI more attractive while they are discouraging ver-
tical FDI. Both types of FDI have a positive impact on welfare by avoiding
the duplication of headquarter activities and by making the global produc-
tion more efficient. They differ, however, in the impact on wages. Vertical
FDI reduces the absolute wage differences between countries and increase
the relative wages within countries. In contrast, horizontal FDI increases the
income in each country, without necessarily changing the distribution.
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2.2 Empirical Evidence
The purpose of this section is to survey the empirical evidence on vertical and
horizontal FDI that has been accumulated to date. The section concentrates
on the empirical evidence of the theories presented in the previous section.11
The empirical evidence is very mixed, as the overview in Table 2.2 on page 26
highlights. Therefore in the following sections we will explain such a variety
of results, the difficulties that cause them and recent trends. In a first step
we introduce the data sources, in the second step we look in more detail on
the results for vertical, horizontal and KC models.
Data sources and main measurements methods
One of the main difficulties in estimating the theories of vertical and horizon-
tal FDI is the lack of empirical data. Official FDI statistics do not distinguish
between vertical and horizontal FDI, thus making empirical studies only pos-
sible with firm level data. The two sources for empirical studies so far were
the BEA data base with US foreign investments and the survey of Swedish
multinational enterprises. The former contains annual data on production of
the foreign affiliates of US firms and is collected by the US Department of
Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.12 The latter is a survey of multi-
national activities of Swedish manufacturers, conducted about every four
years by Institute of Industrial Economics in Stockholm.13 In recent studies
Blonigen et al. (2002) and Braconier et al. (2003) extend the BEA data with
OECD statistics in order to measure the amount of FDI flows and the value
of the foreign production.
Initially, there were two groups of empirical literature on vertical and hor-
izontal FDI. The first tried to explain the total amount of FDI, stock or flow,
between two particular countries, using criteria for the each type in the esti-
11For an extensive overview of general equilibrium models of MNE and their empirical
evidence see Markusen and Maskus (2001).
12See www.bea.doc.gov.
13For more details see Ekholm and Hasselman (2000).
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Table 2.2: Empirical Evidence for Vertical and Horizontal FDI
Sample Measurement Evidence for
(Source) VFDI HFDI KC
Brainard (1993) US Inward local sales, Mixed - -
and outward exports
FDI (BEA)
Brainard (1997) ibid affiliate sales No Yes -
Markusen and ibid affiliate sales, No Yes Mixed
Maskus (2001) exports
Markusen and ibid affiliate sales No Yes No
Maskus (2002)
Carr et al. ibid affiliate sales - - Yes
(2001)
Hanson et al. US outward share exports Yes Mixed -
(2001) FDI (BEA) on sales
Blonigen et al. US inward and affiliate sales, No Yes No
(2002) outward FDI FDI stock
(BEA), (OECD)
Davies (2002) ibid affiliate sales, Yes No Yes
FDI stock
Braconier et al. US, Swedish exports, Yes - Yes
(2002) outward FDI affiliate sales
(BEA), (IUI)
Matha¨ (2002) Swedish FDI affiliate Yes Yes -
in EU (IUI) production,
exports
Braconier et al. FDI 56 home, affiliate sales, - - Yes
(2003) 85 host cntr. FDI Stock
(OECD)
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mation equation. If the criteria of one type of FDI fitted well, all investment
flows between these two countries were interpreted to be of this type (Carr
et. al., 2001, Markusen and Maskus, 2001). The second group estimates the
share of exports in total sales of the affiliate with respect to relevant country
characteristics (Hanson et al., 2001). Such an estimation technique measures
the extent of export orientation or the interaction between the parent and
the affiliate company.
Finally, the amount of vertical FDI was estimated using intra-firm trade
and general trade in components.14 Hanson et al. (2003), for example, exam-
ined the factors of international division of production from the perspective
of trade in input goods between US firms and their foreign affiliates.
Recent Evidence for Vertical FDI
Empirical studies on vertical FDI can be grouped in two stages: early studies
that reject this type of multinational activities and recent studies that widely
confirm the theoretical predictions.
Early empirical work on multinational activities came to the conclusion
that most FDI flows in the world economy are horizontal, while the share of
vertical FDI is very small. Therefore, the models of vertical FDI were re-
jected for several reasons. The first reason is the reliance on export statistics.
As proposed by Brainard (1993), vertical FDI is measured by exports from
the affiliate to the home country. This narrow definition means, however,
that the scope for vertical separation of production is small, given the small
share of exports in total affiliate sales. The second reason to reject the mod-
els of vertical FDI comes from the fact, that the relative labour endowments
between the home and the foreign country, measured as ratio of skilled to
unskilled workers, has no significant effect on the sales of foreign affiliates.
From this point of view, several authors conclude (Carr et al. 2001, Markusen
14For example Yeats (1998) estimates, that about 30 percent of world trade in manu-
facturing goods is trade in components. Another approach was used by Hummels et al.
(2001) who measures trade flows that cross borders multiple times.
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and Maskus, 2001, 2002, and Blonigen et al., 2001), that differences in factor
endowments between countries cannot explain the activities of MNE. Since
this is the basis for the appearance of vertical FDI, the vertical decomposi-
tion of production was denied. A third reason to regard the scope of vertical
FDI as limited is the overwhelming share of FDI flows between similar rich
industrialised countries (Markusen, 1995, Lipsey, 2003). This type of invest-
ment locates new production in similar high-wage economies, which supports
the models of horizontal FDI. More recently, the theory of vertical FDI was
also rejected by Blonigen et al. (2001) as a result of estimating the KC-model.
However, three recent studies show that the role of vertical FDI has been
widely underestimated for several reasons. The first improvement was the
employment of new measurement techniques. Braconier et al. (2002) use a
new approach to estimate the differences between countries. They employ the
difference in relative wage premium and not the relative factor endowments,
measured by ratio of skilled to unskilled workers, as proposed by Carr et al.
(2001) and Markusen and Maskus (2002). The authors argue, that factor
prices are the prime force behind the decision of MNE and not factor endow-
ments. As a result, they found a larger share of vertical FDI than previously
estimated, in particular if exports to third countries are considered. Com-
bining US and Swedish data they found strong support for vertical FDI in
particular in countries with relatively cheap unskilled labour.
While the previous studies took into the account only the exports back
into the home countries, Hanson et al. (2001) employ more recent data on
multinational activities of US firms and show that patterns of multinational
activities in the 1990s were much richer than before. Introducing additional
FDI types as, for example, whole sale and export platforms the authors argue
that vertical FDI plays an important role for US multinationals. Following
Brainard (1997) they estimate the share of exports in total sales of the foreign
affiliate, using GDP per capita as a skill measure. As a result, Hanson et
al. (2001) found strong evidence for vertical FDI and for export platform
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FDI.15 An additional and very important result was the strongly increasing
role of vertical FDI for US multinationals in the 1990s. They also show that
local sales are more attractive in larger markets and that affiliates in smaller
markets are oriented toward exports more than toward local sales. Affiliate
imports for further processing are higher in economies that are larger, have
higher average income and are closer to the US. Finally, Davies (2002) found
empirical evidence for vertical FDI, estimating the KC-model.16
Thus, the last three studies argue that vertical FDI has been underesti-
mated in the earlier empirical attempts. Besides more sophisticated measure-
ment methods, recent empirical findings indicate a growing role of vertical
FDI in the world economy in the recent years. Shatz and Venables (2000)
show an increasing importance of vertical FDI among the outward FDI from
US, Europe and Japan. Hanson et al. (2001) introduce a variety of vertically
related activities of US multinationals in the 1990s. And Marin et al. (2002)
provide empirical evidence for the substantial share of vertical FDI among
German investments in CEE. Finally, Eckholm and Hasselman (2000) show
a growing share of the exports from the foreign affiliate of Swedish multina-
tionals back to Sweden since the middle of 1990s, which provides evidence
for outsourcing and vertical separation of production.
In sum, although initially rejected, more support for vertical FDI arose in
recent years mainly for two reasons: better measurement of criteria responsi-
ble for vertical investment and an increasing share of vertical fragmentation
in the world economy.
Clear Evidence for Horizontal FDI
As Table 2.2 on page 26 highlights, the empirical evidence for horizontal FDI
has been far less controversial than the one on vertical FDI. Most studies
found strong empirical support for horizontal FDI between similar counties,
as predicted by the theoretical models.
15This type of FDI is closely related to vertical FDI, as discussed in the previous section.
16See last part of this section for a detailed discussion of this study.
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In the primary empirical study of horizontal FDI Brainard (1997) found
strong evidence for the proximity-concentration approach. She showed that
the share of local sales by affiliates is increasing in trade costs and trade
barriers. In addition, the sales of foreign affiliates of US firms are higher in
countries with higher transport costs and tariffs. Thirdly, the US multina-
tionals serve the foreign market more through FDI and less through exports,
the larger is the scale of corporate operations relative to the scale of pro-
duction. Here scale economies in headquarters are stronger relative to scale
economies in production, which also supports horizontal FDI. These results
confirm the main characteristics of horizontal FDI to be used as market ac-
cess in remote markets.
Using the same data as in Carr et al. (2001), Markusen and Maskus
(2001) employ the KC-model in order to analyze the impact of market size
and factor differences on the pattern of affiliate production. They found
strong support for horizontal and only little support for vertical FDI. The
Knowledge-capital model is empirically supported, however, it can not be
distinguished from the horizontal model.
A further empirical evidence for horizontal FDI was found by Matha¨
(2002) and Markusen and Maskus (2002). Shatz and Venables (2000), Markusen
(1995) and Lipsey (2003) also argue that horizontal FDI represents by far
the largest share of world investment flows. Despite this, some studies tend
to reject horizontal models in favour of the KC-model.
Mixed Evidence for the KC-Model
Recent studies employ the KC-model as an alternative hypothesis for the
models of vertical and horizontal FDI, even if it formally includes both types
of FDI. In such cases the authors look for evidence which of the three models
can better explain multinational activity.
Carr et al. (2001) employ the 1986-1994 panel data on US multinational
sales and find support for the Knowledge Capital model. In contrast to the
previously mentioned studies, the authors test the KC-model that allows for
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both, vertical and horizontal FDI, to arise endogenously depending on coun-
try size and factor endowments. Thus they get findings similar to Brainard
(1993, 1997) for each type of FDI. However, the estimation is closely re-
lated to the KC-model, since they employ total market size of two countries,
market size differences and differences in factor endowments as explanatory
variables. Carr et al. (2001) provide strong support for the KC-model, find-
ing that affiliate sales increase in total size of the host and home country and
in skill differences, while dissimilarities lead to lower affiliate sales. The last
result is also supported by Markusen and Venables (2000). An additional
result is that affiliate sales are larger, if the home country of the MNE is
small and skilled labour abundant at the same time.
However, Markusen and Maskus (2001) find a negative relation between
affiliate sales and skilled labour abundance in the home country when looking
at outward US FDI only. And Markusen and Maskus (2002) reject the KC-
model as well as the vertical model in favour of the horizontal model as
explanation for the multinational activities investigating investment outflows
from US multinationals. Blonigen et al. (2002) argue that these contradicting
results are based on the incorrect empirical specification of the non-linear
form in the skill difference term. They correct for misspecification by using
the absolute values of factor endowments. Employing the same data set as
Carr et al. (2001), Blonigen et al. (2002) show falling multinational activities
between two countries, if the absolute difference in skilled-labour abundance
and size increases. With this result the authors reject the knowledge capital
model in favour of the horizontal FDI. Blonigen et al. (2002) also strongly
reject the vertical FDI feature of the KC-model, where MNE should have
more activities with greater skill differences.
Moreover, Davies (2002) argues that the KC-model was rejected in favour
of horizontal models because of incomplete specification. By extending the
specification and allowing KC-model a richer specification than the simple
linear relationship between FDI and skill differences in the horizontal model,
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he found evidence for vertical FDI measuring FDI stocks and rejected hor-
izontal model in favour of KC-model. Strong empirical evidence for the
knowledge capital model was found also by Braconier et al. (2003), who
used other measurements for skill differences and a significantly larger data
set. In contrast to Carr et al. (2001), they use a geometric difference for the
measurement of size and factor endowment differences.
Matha¨ (2002) undertakes the most advanced discrimination between ver-
tical and horizontal FDI. He tests the predictions of vertical and horizontal
models, without employing the KC framework. Using sophisticated data on
intra-firm trade of the Swedish multinationals with their affiliates in the EU,
he differentiates between the two sorts of FDI by multiplying each explana-
tory variable with interaction variables. These variables describe the extent
to which affiliate and Swedish parent are tied through forward or backward
trade in input goods. He found that Swedish FDI in the EU can be explained
to a larger extend by the proximity-concentration approach and only to some
extent by the factor-proportion approach. Estimating each type of FDI sep-
arately at the sectoral level, he found evidence for the idea of vertical FDI.
To outline the results of the empirical findings, the first empirical tests
have shown little evidence for vertical FDI and strong evidence for horizontal
FDI, while the support for KC-model was mixed. However, recent studies
give strong support to vertical FDI and to the KC-model due to improved
measurements of key characteristics like factor and size differences. Recent
studies also show the growing importance of vertical FDI in the global FDI
flows in the last 10 years.
2.3 Conclusion
The literature on horizontal and vertical FDI emerged in the mid 1980s
from the Heckscher-Ohlin-model of international trade. Models of horizontal
FDI explain the appearance of multinationals from a proximity-concentration
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trade-off, while the vertical models explain FDI flows as a possibility to ex-
ploit factor price differences between countries. Recently, the Knowledge
Capital model nests the two motives within one model. However, all models
explore the appearance of a particular FDI type for given country character-
istics, while the question of impacts is still widely unanswered. Empirically,
distinguishing between the two types of FDI was a substantial progress in
the analysis of MNE activities, since aggregating over the activities of foreign
affiliates may mask the presence of different types of FDI and give an incom-
plete picture of the range of operations performed by multinationals abroad.
Recent studies attempt to solve these problems. Initially vertical FDI has
been underestimated and only horizontal FDI found empirical support. The
situation changed in the last few years, as new studies with extended data
sets and more sophisticated measurements of country differences appeared.
Hence, latest studies show strong empirical evidence for vertical FDI as well
as for the KC-model.
Although, as the chapter makes clear, several questions are still open.
On the theoretical side there is only one model (KC-model) which captures
both types of FDI. Unfortunately, it can only be solved by computer simu-
lation, thus making the analysis of single effects very difficult. Secondly, the
existing models describe the appearance of a particular type of FDI, leaving
the question of impacts on the host and home countries open. The empirical
differentiation between vertical and horizontal FDI is also not clear cut. One
plant may serve both markets and low production costs are also an impor-
tant motivation for horizontal firms. However, the measurement of vertical
investments is crucial for the empirical analysis of effects of each FDI type.17
The following chapters will try to answer some of these questions.
17Matha¨ (2002) shows for Swedish multinationals that depending on what relationship
of total exports, intermediate exports and affiliate sales is used, the extent of vertical
multinational activities of Swedish firms comes out to be very different.
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Chapter 3
FDI Life Cycle in Transition
Countries
3.1 Introduction
Since the fall of the Iron Curtain, transition economies of Central and East-
ern Europe (CEE) have experienced continuously growing inflow of foreign
direct investment (FDI). At the same time these countries have seen rapid
changes in their main economic characteristics like per capita income, cost
of production and quality of infrastructure. Have these changes of country
characteristics had an impact on the type of FDI inflows besides the absolute
amount? Can these changes explain the fact, that some of initial investors
are leaving this region while the total amount of FDI inflows is still growing?
To answer these questions, this chapter explores the time pattern of vertical
and horizontal FDI in CEE transition countries.
Vertical FDI occurs when a multinational enterprise (MNE) fragments the
production process internationally, locating production stages in countries
where it can be conducted at the lowest costs. Horizontal FDI takes place
when a MNE undertakes the same production in different countries, locating
the production near to the customer. An explanation for the former is given
by Helpman (1984), Helpman and Krugman (1985) and for the latter by
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Markusen (1984) and Markusen and Venables (1998, 2000).
This chapter builds on two results from the previous literature: First,
countries with different characteristics attract different types of FDI.1 Hori-
zontal FDI occurs in large foreign markets, while vertical FDI arises if there
are differences in factor prices. Second, the characteristics of transition coun-
tries change relatively fast over time.2 These two observations lead to the
conclusion, that the transition countries must experience different types of
FDI inflow over time. Empirically this can be observed as a change in the
composition of foreign investments.
The intuition behind the changes in the composition of FDI flows is as
follows. After the opening of transition countries their markets were charac-
terised by low input prices, in particular a cheap labour force. At this stage
cost seeking vertical FDI enter the market and increase local wages and the
income of the host country. During the catching-up process, higher purchas-
ing power makes the host country more attractive for the market seeking
horizontal FDI. Higher inflows of horizontal FDI lead to a further increase of
wages and income. At the same time higher wages reduce the comparative
advantage of the host country. The market is not attractive for vertical FDI
anymore, which in turn falls or even even leads to a reallocation of existing
production to cheaper locations.3 Despite a decrease of vertical FDI, wages
in the host country are still growing, as more horizontal FDI flows into the
country than vertical FDI leaves.4 Thus, at the end of the catching up pro-
cess horizontal FDI should dominate the investment inflows.
1See for example Markusen et. al. (1996), and Markusen and Maskus (2003).
2UNCTAD (2001) and Gros and Suhrcke (2001).
3For example 300 US manufacturing plants were relocated in 1999 and 2000 from
Mexico to China due to lower labour costs (The Economist, 2003). For similar examples
from China and India see Patibandla (2001).
4Empirical studies show a dominant role of horizontal FDI in the world economy, see
Hanson et al. (2001) for discussion.
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Previous related literature can be grouped in two parts. In the first,
the rise of a particular type of FDI is explained by relevant country char-
acteristics. However, only a few studies incorporate vertical and horizontal
multinational activities simultaneously. The first integration of the theories
of vertical and horizontal multinationals was conducted by Markusen et al.
(1996). The authors provide a theoretical model in which both types of MNE
arise endogenously depending on country characteristics. The simulated re-
sults of the general equilibrium model show the dominance of vertical FDI if
countries differ significantly in relative factor endowments. Horizontal FDI
dominates when countries are similar in size and relative factor endowments.
Using the same general equilibrium model Zhang and Markusen (1999) refine
the role of market size and labour force composition for FDI inflows. The
model covers the appearance of vertical FDI in relation to domestic firms
and derives two results relevant for this chapter: The inward investment to
GDP ratio is falling in country size, and the relationship between FDI and
differences in relative factor endowments between home and host countries
has an inversed U-shaped form.
The second group of the literature explores the impact of FDI on the
host country.5 The list of possible impacts includes growth, wages and input
prices in the host country. Of particular interest is Glass and Saggi (2001),
who argue that incoming horizontal FDI increases the price of the local inter-
mediate good. Furthermore, analysing the decision of MNE between exports
and horizontal FDI for serving the foreign market, the authors found a pos-
itive impact of the country size on the investment flow.
On the empirical side, several studies found evidence for vertical and hor-
izontal FDI. Markusen and Maskus (2002) nest the two types of investments
within the knowledge-capital model and test all three models empirically.
The results give strong support to the horizontal FDI model and reject the
vertical FDI model. Carr et al. (2001) show that FDI flows are related
5See Lipsey (2002), Blomstro¨m and Kokko (2003) and Chapter 5 for an overview.
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to different country characteristics. In particular, outward investment is in-
creasing in the sum of economic size of both countries and their similarity in
size the relative skilled-labour abundance of the parent nation.
Finally, estimating the determinants of FDI in China, Sun et al. (2002)
found changes in motivation of the FDI inflows through time. Before 1991,
wages have had a positive relationship with FDI but a negative relationship
subsequently. Size of the market, as measured by the regional GDP did not
play a role in the 1980s at all, but became highly significant in the 1990s.
Changing time pattern of FDI was also addressed in the business liter-
ature. Moran (2000) presents a similar link between product life cycle and
the FDI strategy of a firm. Patibandla (2001) gives some examples for China
and India, when changes in the set of determinants for FDI affect the pattern
of FDI inflows.
In this chapter, the FDI Life Cycle is described from the perspective of a
host transition country. In contrast, the composition of FDI outflows from
industrialised countries follow another time path: the horizontal FDI domi-
nates in the beginning and loses the importance in favour of vertical FDI.6
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. The next section presents
a theoretical model, which describes the dynamic interaction between verti-
cal and horizontal FDI. Section 3 explores the empirical evidence of FDI Life
Cycle, concentrating on FDI composition on one side and country character-
istics on the other. Section 4 provides empirical tests of the composition of
FDI inflows to major CEE countries. Finally, section 5 concludes.
6See Bourguignon et al. (2002). In the 1980s, FDI outflows from developed countries
went to other industrialised regions and were mostly horizontal. While in the 1990s vertical
FDI to emerging markets of South Eastern Asia and specially China became dominating
(Hanson et al., 2002). In a recent study Matha¨ (2002) shows empirically that large Swedish
MNE became to an increasing extent vertically integrated.
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3.2 The Model
3.2.1 Economic Environment
Consider two countries, home h and foreign f . A domestic and a foreign firm
produce a final good x. Producing one unit of final good x requires one unit
of intermediate good y, which is produced by a monopolistic supplier in each
country. For simplicity we assume that there is one firm and one supplier in
each market in both countries.7 Demand for the final good x in country i is
given by an inverse demand curve
Pi = Ai −Qi, i ∈ [h, f ] (3.1)
where P is the price, Q the quantity and A a constant which measures the
size of the market in country i. In case of market entry, the firms act under
Cournot-competition, choosing quantities for the final good x.8 Transporta-
tion costs for the input good are denoted by t. For the final good we assume
for simplicity prohibitive transportation costs, so there is no trade in final
goods in the model.
Thus, to serve a foreign market firms have to produce the final good
locally. We exclude exports since the decision between exports and FDI
was already discussed by Glass and Saggi (2001) and Helpman et al. (2002).
Furthermore, incorporation of exports does not contribute to the decision be-
tween vertical and horizontal FDI. This proceeding is contrary to the frame-
work of Glass and Saggi (2001), who assume a local content requirement for
FDI: if the firm conducts horizontal FDI it has to source the input good from
the local supplier. Thus, unlike Glass and Saggi we allow for trade in input
goods and exclude trade in final goods, while Glass and Saggi build on trade
7The results of the model also hold in the case of multiple oligopolistic firms in each
market. The structure of the model is similar to the models of international trade with
two factors of productions. For simplicity it is assumed, that the price for skilled labour
is the same in both countries, so we can concentrate on the first factor (unskilled labour).
8We obtain similar results in case of Bertrand competition, see Glass and Saggi (2001)
for the proof in case of the trade off between horizontal FDI and exports.
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in final goods and no trade in input goods.
Following Markusen (1995) we differentiate between vertical and hori-
zontal type of FDI on the basis of the geographical placement of production
stages. Vertical FDI occurs in case of geographic separation of production:
the input good y is produced in one country, while the final good x in the
other country. Horizontal FDI is characterised by duplicating the final stage
of production in both countries.9 Figure 3.1, cases 3 and 4 respectively, il-
lustrates both types in a two country, two stages matrix. This definition
of vertical and horizontal FDI does not consider the ownership structure.10
We also abstract from the modelling of market entry (Greenfield versus Ac-
quisition), thus focusing on the decision of the firm about the location of
production.11
The economic environment in the model looks as follows. After the open-
ing of their markets, transition countries have a low purchasing power and
thus smaller markets in comparison to the industrialised countries. To cap-
ture this effect we assume, that in the beginning the foreign market is smaller
than the home market:
Ah > Af
with the country size measured by the total demand A from the equation
(3.1). To reproduce the catching-up process in the transition countries we
9According to Markusen et al. (1996), an alternative definition could be the differenti-
ation on the fact, whether the final good is exported to the home market or is sold locally,
given that both stages are in the same country.
10The foreign firm sets up a 100 percent affiliate that obtains input goods and sells them
to the parent firm. For simplicity we abstract from this stage in the model. An alternative
explanation could be, that the firms get some minority control of the supplier paying a
zero price if it buys input goods from him.
11For detailed analysis of the entry mode decision see Mu¨ller (2002). It is possible to
extend the model in a way, that the firm must buy a supplier in order to draw input
goods from him (Acquisition) or to set up a new supplier (Greenfield FDI). However, such
extension will give no additional insight in the decision of the firm to source the input
good production in the other country.
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Figure 3.1: FDI Life Cycle: Four Cases
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assume that the size of the foreign market is growing faster than in the home
country. Thus, the size of the market will change exogenously.12
A final good producer faces fixed costs F if it enters a foreign market
f . This is a plausible assumption, since the new entrant has to spend a
substantial amount for marketing or for product adjustments to satisfy local
requirements. In addition we assume, that fixed costs for entering the home
market h are prohibitively high.13 As a result, the model focuses on FDI
inflows into the smaller host country f , since the main idea concerns the
composition of FDI inflows to the host transition country.
We also assume lower production costs of the input good in the host
country than in the home country:
ch > cf
In the production of the final good variable costs are equal to zero, so the
only cost the firm has to pay is the price of the input good. And finally we
assume for simplicity, that vertically integrated firm can not source the input
good in two countries simultaneously.14
3.2.2 Four Cases
The model consists of four cases, which are presented in Figure 3.1. In the
first step we consider the autarky, with two completely separated markets
and no FDI (case 1). This is a benchmark for the further analysis to show
12It is possible to nest the model with a growth model, where the incoming FDI con-
tribute to the country growth by importing capital and technology. See discussion in the
“Results” section.
13This is a simplifying but realistic assumption, since it is very difficult for the firms
from developing countries to enter the markets of final goods in industrialised countries.
14The firm has such incentive in order to minimize the input price. Then we get a
competition between input good suppliers in both countries.
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in a simple way the interaction of the final good producer with the supplier.
Then the markets open, giving an opportunity for FDI. Here we will observe
vertical and no horizontal FDI (case 2), as long as the foreign market is very
small. If the size of the foreign market increases, both types of FDI take place
(case 3). Finally, if the foreign market becomes very large, only horizontal
FDI will exist (case 4). Given a growing economy in the foreign country, each
stage sequentially arises from the previous as the size of the foreign market
increases. Thus, one can interpret them as a time pattern. In each stage we
look at the profits of the final good producer and of the supplier for a given
market size. Then we derive price and quantity of the input good and thus
the incentives for vertical and horizontal FDI.
Case 1: Autarky
The situation in autarky is presented in Figure 3.1 (case 1): In each country
producer of intermediate goods supplies only the local upstream firm. The
final good producer on his part serves only the local markets and has no
access to the foreign market. Thus, the upstream firm and the supplier are
both monopolists in their markets. The profit function of the upstream firm
in autarky is:
ΠA =
(
pi − wAi
)
qAi (3.2)
where p is the price of the final good, q is quantity of final good and w the
price of the input good. Remember that the upstream firm needs one unit of
input good in order to produce one unit of the final good. Then, inserting the
demand for the final good in the profit function yields the demand function
for the intermediate good:
qAi =
Ai − wAi
2
(3.3)
The profit function of the input good supplier depends on price and quan-
tity of the input good in the country i, as well as on variable costs ci:
ΠS,A =
(
wAi − ci
)
qAi (3.4)
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As a monopolist, the supplier sets the price for the intermediate good to
maximize his profit. Inserting the quantity of the input good into equation
(3.4) we get the price for the intermediate good in autarky:
wAi =
Ai + ci
2
(3.5)
As equation (3.5) shows, the price for the intermediate good depends on
the size of the market and the production costs of the input good. Given
the smaller size of the foreign market (Af < Ah) and the lower production
costs of the input good, the price for the intermediate good in the foreign
country is lower than in the home country. Thus, there will be an incentive
for the final good producer from h to source the input good from the cheaper
country f . This situation is plausible for most transition countries in Central
and Eastern Europe after the opening of their markets.
Case 2: Vertical FDI only
Now we consider a market opening, when firms gain access to the foreign
market through FDI. As derived in the previous section, the price for the
input good in the foreign country f is lower than in the home country h
(wf < wh), which creates an incentive for vertical FDI. At the same time
we start with a small foreign market to illustrate the catching-up process as
discussed in the introduction. In this situation there is only vertical and no
horizontal FDI as presented in Figure 3.1 (case 2): The upstream firm from
the home country serves the local market h, drawing the input good from
the foreign country f . Thus, there is by definition vertical FDI in country
f , since the production for the home market is geographically separated.
The necessary condition for this case can be derived from the inequality
wf + t < wh by inserting the prices in each country:
15
Af < Ah − 3t+ 2 (ch − cf )
On the other side, there is no horizontal FDI given fixed costs F for the
market entry and small market size Af . The small market size does not allow
15See section 1 in Appendix 3.6 for derivation.
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for the investor to cover the fixed costs for the market entry, even if the final
good producer in the foreign country is a monopolist. The threshold level
for the market size can be derived from the profit function of investor:16
Af ≤ 4.2
√
F + 0.3Ah − 0.3t+ 0.7cf
Besides fixed costs and the size of the foreign market this condition also
includes the size of the home market Ah, transportation costs t and variable
costs for the intermediate good cf . All these terms influence the price for the
input good in the foreign country and thus the profit of the horizontal final
good producer in case of market entry. If this condition does not hold, both
types of FDI take place as described in the next case 3.
The final good producer in the foreign country f is a monopolist on his
own market, since the firm from the home country serves only the local
market in h. The monopolistic profit function of the local firm in the foreign
country is still similar to the one in autarky:
Πnh = (pf − wf ) qnf (3.6)
Local firm´s demand for intermediate good is also the same as in autarky:
qnf =
Af − wf
2
(3.7)
Since the price for the input good is lower in country f , the final good
producer from country h separates the production geographically and sources
the input good in country f as illustrated in Figure 3.1. The profit function
of the upstream firm from h equals to
Πvh = (ph − wf − t) qh (3.8)
and depends positively on prices and quantities of the final good in h, but
negatively on prices of the intermediate good in f and transportation costs.
The firm does not face the fixed costs since it serves the final good market
16See section 2 in Appendix 3.6 for derivation.
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in the own country. From the profit function in (3.8) we obtain the demand
of vertical firm for intermediate good required in country h:
qvh =
Ah − wf − t
2
(3.9)
Thus, the supplier in country f produces intermediate goods for the local
firm and for the vertical firm as well. His profit function is determined by
both quantities qf and qh from equations (3.7) and (3.9) respectively, and
equals to
ΠSf = (wf − cf )
(
Af + Ah − 2wf − t
2
)
(3.10)
Solving the profit maximisation problem of the monopolist gives the price
for the intermediate good in case 2:
wf =
Af + Ah − t+ 2cf
4
(3.11)
In contrast to the case of autarky it depends also on the size of the home
market and transportation costs. Price comparison for autarky and open
markets from equations (3.5) and (3.11) illustrates, that given a larger home
market (Ah > Af ), the price of the input good in the open host economy is
higher than in autarky: wf > w
A
f . Thus, market openness and appearance
of vertical FDI lead to a price increase in the host country, which is an im-
portant result for the further analysis.
Case 3: Vertical and Horizontal FDI
In case 3 we consider an exogeneous increase of the size of the foreign market
Af in a way, that market size is large enough for the firm from h to cover
fixed costs of market entry:
Af > 4.2
√
F + 0.3Ah − 0.3t+ 0.7cf
It is now profitable for the final good producer from the home country to set
up an affiliate in the country f , which produces the final good and serves the
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foreign market. Thus, the firm from h duplicates the final good production
in both countries and we get a horizontal FDI by definition.
At the same time the foreign market is not very large,
Af < Ah − 11
4
t+
7
4
(ch − cf )
so that the condition from case 2 holds for the vertical FDI and guarantees,
that the input good is cheaper in the foreign country and vertical separation
as in case 2 exists.17 Therefore, in case 3 we observe vertical and horizontal
FDI simultaneously.18
Thus, in case 3 the local upstream firm in country f faces a new com-
petitor, the horizontal market entrant. Given Cournot-competition, profits
of both firms in final good sector depend on the quantity sold by the com-
petitor. The profit function of the local final good producer is therefore:
Πnf =
(
Af − qnf − qhf − wf
)
qf (3.12)
The profit function of the new horizontal firm looks similar to the local
competitor. However, in addition the new firm has to bear fixed costs for
market entry:
Πhf = (pf − wf ) qf − F fh =
(
Af − qnf − qhf − wf
)
qf − F (3.13)
Using a standard profit maximisation approach under Cournot-competition
we get the demand for input good from the local supplier. Since both firms
have the same variable costs, the demand of the local and horizontal firm for
intermediate good in country f is the same:
qnf = q
h
f =
Af − wf
3
(3.14)
17See section 3 in Appendix 3.6 for derivation. It can be easily shown, that both condi-
tion hold simultaneously.
18In the model the same firm undertakes vertical and horizontal FDI since we have only
one final good producer in each country.
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The geographically separated part of the upstream firm from country h is
still buying the input good in f and serving the home market in h. It faces
the same profit optimisation problem as in the case 2, shown in equation
(3.8). The demand of the upstream firm from country h for intermediate
good in country f is the same as before:
qvf =
Ah − wf − t
2
(3.15)
The supplier of intermediate goods in the country f now faces the demand
from three sources: from the local firm in f and from the h-firm, which
now serves the foreign and the home market. Inserting quantities from the
equations (3.14) and (3.15) yields the profit function of the supplier:
ΠSf = (wf − cf )
(
2 (Af − wf )
3
+
Ah − wf − t
2
)
(3.16)
Derivation with respect to wf gives the optimal price for the input good in
case 3:
wf =
4Af + 3Ah − 3t+ 7cf
14
(3.17)
Again, the price for the input good depends on the size of the home
and the foreign market. Furthermore, the price for the intermediate good is
higher in the presence of vertical and horizontal FDI than in both previous
cases. Thus, additional FDI leads to a further increase of the price for input
good in the host country and makes the geographical separation (i.e. vertical
FDI) less attractive.19
Case 4: Only Horizontal FDI
As we have seen from the previous two cases, a larger market and incoming
FDI has led to a higher price for the input good in the host country. Thus,
in the last step we look at the case when the foreign market is large enough,
for prices for intermediate goods in both countries to become similar:
wf + t < wh, wh + t < wf
19This can be shown by inserting the new wage from equation (3.17) in the profit function
of the vertical firm in equation (3.8).
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Now it is more favorable for the final good producers to buy the input good
from the local supplier in each country separately.
Inserting the prices for the intermediate goods for both countries in these
conditions gives the size of foreign country, when the price for the input good
in f is the same as in the home country h in consideration of transportation
costs:20
A¯f ≥ Ah − 11
4
t+
7
4
(ch − cf )
If the demand for the final good in the foreign country f increases to A¯,
higher production of the final good by horizontal FDI and local firm pushes
the price for the intermediate good in f at the same level as in h. So there
are no more incentives for vertical separation of production. The firm from
country h serves both markets, conducting both stages in each country as
shown in Figure 3.1 (case 4) and sources input goods in each country. As a
result, there is only horizontal and no vertical FDI in a large and expensive
foreign country.
For the sake of completeness we look at profits and prices in this stage. In
country f the profit and the demand for the input good of the local firm and
of the horizontal MNE are the same as in the case 3, equations (3.13) and
(3.14). The price for the input good is derived in the same way as in previous
stages and equals to wf = (Af + cf )/2.
21 In the home country the producer
of final goods buys input goods from the local supplier and gets monopolistic
profits, so this case is identical to the case (1) of autarky. Remember that
due to the assumption of high fixed costs in h, the foreign firm can not serve
the home market with final goods.
20The exit of the vertical FDI from the foreign market will lead to a short fall of wf .
However, vertical FDI will not enter the foreign market again, since this will increase the
price over the old level.
21See Table 3.6 in Appendix 3.6 for an overview.
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3.2.3 Results and Discussion
The results of the model are summarised in Figure 3.2, which shows the in-
centives for both types of FDI depending on the size of the host country Af .
For vertical FDI the incentive for entering the foreign market is the difference
between the profit with local sourcing of input good in h and the profit in
case of geographical separation of production stages.22 For horizontal FDI it
is the profit in case of market entry from equation (3.13).23 The main result
presented in Figure 3.2 is that larger foreign market means falling incentives
for vertical FDI but growing incentives for horizontal FDI. Thus, during the
catching-up process in transition countries vertical FDI are expected to be
replaced by horizontal FDI.
Figure 3.2 illustrates that in a small foreign market only vertical FDI
exists due to cheaper input goods in the foreign country. There is no hor-
izontal FDI in this situation because the small market size and fixed costs
for market entry lead to negative profits for this type of FDI. For very small
values of the market size there is a special case with a horizontal incentive
line for vertical FDI. This is because the foreign market is very small, so the
size of the market has no impact on the profitability of vertical FDI, since
there is no production of the final good in the foreign country at all.24 Larger
size of the foreign market Af allows the potential market entrant to cover
fixed costs due to higher operational revenue and to enter the market for
final goods. Thus, growing country size leads to more horizontal FDI but as
a consequence also to higher demand and price for the input good in country
f . An increasing input price has a negative impact on vertical FDI, which
22See section 4 in Appendix 3.6 for mathematical derivation.
23The curves are not continuous because in each stage there is a different amount of final
good producers and therefore a different price function for the input good. For calculations
of incentive functions see section 4 in Appendix 3.6.
24The small market size and high price for the intermediate good due to the demand
from the foreign country lead to negative profits of the local producer of final good in f .
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Figure 3.2: FDI Incentives and the Size of the Foreign Market
is therefore falling with respect to market size. Finally, if the market size
reaches the level of A¯f , there will be only horizontal FDI and no vertical FDI.
Thus, the price for the input good is the main driving force for the vertical
FDI, while for the horizontal FDI it is the market size.
Besides the main result of FDI Life Cycle, there are some further out-
comes from the model. The first is that incoming vertical and horizontal FDI
increase the price of the input good. In particular, vertical FDI can be seen
as a negative externality for the host country, since the demand for input
goods from abroad increases the local prices. In the extreme case of a very
small foreign market it can even lead to a full crowding out of the local pro-
duction of final good in the foreign country, as illustrated by the horizontal
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line on the left side of Figure 3.2. The second result is that horizontal FDI
crowds out vertical FDI, since larger market attracts more horizontal FDI
which increases the price for input good. Furthermore, this crowding-out ef-
fect can lead to even higher input good prices, since we know, that horizontal
FDI is dominating over vertical FDI in the world economy.
Some additional remarks can be made about the theoretical model. First,
the model is set up in a way, that increasing country size leads to a higher
price for the input good. It is also possible to set up the model in the other
direction, when increasing input prices lead to a larger market for final goods,
since the input prices can be interpreted as local wages. Then, higher wages
lead to higher consumption of the final good. However, this line of reasoning
requires the modelling of personal utilities, consumption and a relationship
between wages and consumption. As a result, one will get the same FDI
pattern of vertical and horizontal FDI, as long as there are increasing wages
and growing market size.
Secondly, one should examine the two extreme cases with only vertical
FDI (case 2) and only horizontal FDI (case 4). They are included in the anal-
ysis in order to illustrate the idea of FDI Life Cycle. These cases are possible
for several industries, but in an economy as a whole, they are rather unlikely,
since the foreign market is big enough for at least some small amount of
horizontal FDI. In addition, if wages in the home country of the MNE are
also growing, it can be profitable for vertical FDI to separate the production
chain even if the foreign market becomes more expensive. In such cases, the
cross in Figure 3.2 becomes smoother and curves VFDI and HFDI do not
cross the horizontal axis. The main idea however holds: if summing up both
types of FDI flows, the share of the vertical FDI will decrease and of the
horizontal will increase over time.
51
3.3 Descriptive Analysis
As the theoretical model has shown, the changing structure of FDI inflows
is based on two factors: changes of country characteristics on the one side
and different motives for going abroad on the other. Starting from this ob-
servation, the section presents empirical evidence for the model. The first
section illustrates the changes in country characteristics and the dominant
role of FDI in transition economies. Then the firm level data will be in-
troduced in order to analyse vertical and horizontal FDI. Finally, the last
section describes the composition of FDI inflows in CEE countries.
3.3.1 Changes in Country characteristics
After the collapse of planned economies the Central and Eastern European
countries are undergoing substantial changes of their economies. We describe
these changes using two country characteristics related to the theoretical
model: market size measured by GDP, and production costs measured by
unit labour costs.
Table 3.1 presents the changes of GDP for selected CEE countries as
measurement for the purchasing power and the size of the market in the host
transition country. The table illustrates two main results: The countries are
undergoing substantial changes in market size and costs of production on the
one side, and on the other side, the amount of changes varies significantly
among the countries. Almost all countries experienced an increase in GDP
per Capita. However, this positive effect is much stronger in the accession
countries. Thus, one can clearly separate the CEE countries in two groups:
the accession countries featuring an overall strong recovery from initial de-
cline and the rest of the region featuring a rather slow recovery. As a result,
the countries in the first group becomes more attractive for market seeking
FDI, while the second group was characterised by rather shrinking market
size, making them less attractive for this type of investment.
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Table 3.1: Changes of Market Size and Production Costs in Selected CEE
Countries, in Percent, 1990-2000, at Constant Prices
GDP per Capita Unit Labour Costs
Accession Countries
Czech Republic 25 116
Hungary 56 28
Poland 92 242
Slovakia 39 46
Slovenia 68 28
Other countries
Bulgaria 14 -50
Romania 7 26
Russia -8 -47
Ukraine -25 129
Source: WIIW Handbook of Statistics, different years.
Similar difference between country groups appears in case of unit labour
costs (ULC). The Central European countries have experienced strong in-
crease of unit labour costs whereas the CIS and the South Eastern countries
had a constant or even falling costs of labour. As Table 3.1 illustrates, unit
labour costs went up by more then 100 percent in the Czech Republic and 240
percent in Poland. The second country group has rather negative or steady
development. Thus, measured by production costs, the accession countries
became less attractive for cost seeking vertical FDI than the south Eastern
or CIS countries.
One of the key arguments of the model was that FDI inflows affect factor
prices in the host country. But an impact on prices is only possible, if foreign
firms have enough market power. Therefore, in the next step we explore
whether foreign owned enterprises have a significant share in the demand for
input goods and in particular labour in the host country.
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Table 3.2: Share of Foreign Owned Enterprises in Selected CEE Countries,
in Percent
Employment Investment Sales
1996 1999 1996 1999 1996 1999
Czech Republic 13.1 26.9 33.5 52.7 22.6 42.4
Hungary 36.1 46.5 82.5 82.2 61.4 73.0
Poland 12.0 29.4 30.6 63.1 17.4 49.0
Source: Hunya (2002).
Large inflows of FDI accompanied by an extensive privatisation of na-
tional enterprises resulted in a substantial role of foreign owned enterprises
(FOE) in CEE. Table 3.2 reports the share of FOE´s on employment, invest-
ment and total sales in the three largest host countries for the FDI in CEE.25
In all three countries the share of FOE is very high and has dramatically
increased from 1996 to 1999. In Hungary foreign firms employ almost half
of the whole labour force and conduct more than 70 percent of all sales by
private firms. Similar high levels can be also observed in the Czech Republic
and Poland. In all countries the share of FOE on total investment exceeds
50 percent. In some industries it is even higher, for example peaking the 90
percent in the banking sector in several accession countries.26 In addition,
several empirical studies found evidence for the positive effect of FDI on the
wages in the host countries.27 Thus, there is a strong empirical evidence that
FDI can increase wages in the host country and that in Central and Eastern
Europe the FOE have significant market power to influence the prices for the
input goods.
25For the role of MNE in other regions of the world see Lipsey et al. (1998).
26The Economist (2002).
27See Fenstra and Hanson (1997) for Mexico, Lipsey and Sjo¨holm (2002) for Indonesia
and Bedi and Cielsik (2002) for Poland.
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3.3.2 Changing Structure of FDI Inflows
From the theoretical model we would expect, that the amount of vertical FDI
will decrease over time, while the number of horizontal FDI will grow. In
order to differentiate between vertical and horizontal FDI flows we employ the
data from a firm survey conducted by the Chair for International Economics
at the University of Munich.28
Using the information about the time of investment and the intra-firm
trade we compute the amount of vertical and horizontal FDI in CEE over
time. From the information on intra-firm trade between parent company
and its foreign affiliate in CEE each FDI project can be assigned to vertical
or horizontal type according to the following rule: An investment project
is defined to be of vertical type if the affiliate receives more than 50 per-
cent of inputs from the parent company or, if more than 50 percent of the
affiliate production is exported to the German parent company. Thus, the
“or” condition includes both type of FDI, forward and backward integrated
vertical FDI respectively.29 The high share guarantees that only firms with
predominantly vertical production strategy are defined as vertical.
To generate the share of each FDI type in total FDI inflows to a partic-
ular country we proceed in three steps: In the first step we derive from the
information on the intra-firm trade, whether a particular investment project
is of vertical or of horizontal type. For this purpose we use the criteria pre-
sented above. Then, we aggregate the number of projects of each type for
each country and year.30 Finally we calculate the share of these projects on
the total number of FDI projects for each country and year. The chapter em-
ploys the number of projects, even though the data contains the information
28See Chapter 1.3 for the description of the data set.
29See Chapter 1 for definitions of forward and backward vertical FDI. Other possible
approaches are presented in Chapter 4.
30Although it is a cross section data, the firms were asked about the year in which the
affiliate has been set up. The year of foundation varies between 1989 and 2001.
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Figure 3.3: Share of Vertical FDI in CEE over Time, in Percent of Total
German Projects
on volume of FDI and on local sales of the affiliate.31
The results are presented in Figure 3.3 which displays the share of vertical
FDI projects on the total number of conducted German FDI´s in CEE from
1989 to 2001. As the curve illustrates, the share of vertical FDI was relatively
constant at the level of about 40 percent in the first half of the 1990s and is
falling in the second part of the 1990s. Thus, we can observe a decreasing
share of vertical FDI as predicted by the theoretical model. The situation is
even clearer when looking at single countries. While in the Czech Republic
31The volume of FDI from the data set can not be used for this purpose, since the
questionnaire only asks for cumulated FDI volume since the first year of investment. Thus,
it was not possible to separate the volume for each year. Neither the sales of foreign affiliate
can be used, as the cross section data is available only for the last year.
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Figure 3.4: Share of Backward and Forward Vertical FDI in CEE, in Percent
of Total German Projects
and in Hungary the share is also constantly falling, it remains constant or
even grows over time in South Eastern countries like Romania and Bulgaria.32
There could be several reasons for the constant share in the beginning of
the transformation process. The explanation most compatible to the model
is that the wage increase in the early 1990s was compensated by falling trans-
action costs. Another reason could be an early market entry by large MNE
with “deep pockets”. Even making losses in small markets they use the first
mover advantage in order to secure market share.
Finally, in order to give a deeper insight into the time pattern of vertical
32See Chapter 5 for the Czech Republic.
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FDI, Figure 3.4 presents both components of this FDI type, backward export
oriented and forward host market oriented vertical FDI. As described in the
data section, these two types form the vertical FDI by definition. Since the
beginning of the 1990s, forward vertical FDI has been constantly falling, be-
cause more input goods and services became available locally. The pattern of
export oriented vertical FDI is more sophisticated. In the first half of 1990’s
the share had been increasing, since a growing number of investors used
the opportunity of cheap production for the export markets. Appearance
of new markets and improving infrastructure contributed to this increase.
However, after 1995 the share of new export oriented projects has been con-
stantly falling. Rapidly increasing production costs made the CEE region
less attractive for pure cost seeking investments.33 Thus, both components
of vertical FDI have been falling in the second half of the 1990s, contributing
to the decline of vertical FDI as a whole.
An even stronger evidence should come from a larger data set. First, the
employed data set does not contain the information on disinvestments. So we
can only observe the incoming FDI flows, but not the withdrawals.34 Looking
at the disinvestment statistics should give an even more clear-cut picture of
possible production relocations. Second, FDI is a long term investment, so
it will take a longer period of time for clear observation of possible removals
of vertical FDI from the market.
Additional empirical support for the substitution of vertical by horizontal
FDI comes from the composition of trade flows between CEE and EU. An
empirical study conducted by UNECE (2002) shows that horizontal trade
in manufacturing goods has gained a larger share since 1996 in the Czech
33See Table 3.1 for illustration of this effect.
34Some cases of disinvestment conducted by large MNE from former “cheap” markets
were mentioned in the daily financial news. For example Microsoft, the world biggest
software developer, has relocated his software development activities from Hungary to
Russia. In another case, Nokia, a Finnish mobile phone producer, closed its production in
Estonia to the benefit of cheaper production in China.
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Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia. At the same time vertical trade
has increased in a low cost location such as Romania. Since in several CEE
countries FOE have a majority share on the country exports, it leads to the
conclusion, that the horizontal affiliates of MNE are dominating in advanced
CEE countries in the last years.
In sum, the data for Central and Eastern Europe support the FDI Life
Cycle model: The share of vertical FDI is falling over time while the amount
of horizontal FDI is increasing.
3.4 Empirical Evidence
In order to explore the empirical evidence for the idea of FDI Life Cycle
this section derives hypotheses from the theoretical model presented in this
chapter and confronts them with empirical estimations.
3.4.1 Hypotheses
The results from the theoretical model can be summarised in four hypothe-
ses. Each of them deals with a factor that has an impact on one or both
types of FDI and thus on the composition of FDI flows as a whole. The
results derived from he model will be also extended by the findings from the
previous literature on vertical and horizontal FDI.
Hypothesis 1: Country size has a positive effect on horizontal FDI.
The size of the host market is the main driving force in the theoretical model:
Larger markets lead to higher profits for the market seeking horizontal FDI
and therefore, attract more horizontal investments. This result is supported
by Zhang and Markusen (2001) and Carr et al. (2001) predicts that horizon-
tal FDI dominates between countries with similar size. In case of transition
countries, similarity in size means faster convergence to Germany, which will
lead to a higher share of German horizontal FDI in Central and Eastern Eu-
rope.
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Hypothesis 2: Low labour costs attract more vertical FDI.
Low-cost production opportunity is the key driving force behind vertical FDI.
From the theoretical literature on vertical FDI we know that factor costs dif-
ferences are the main criteria for vertical FDI.35 Theoretical literature uses
the factor endowment differences to explain the appearance of vertical FDI.36
Braconier et al. (2002) argue that factor prices (i.e. wages) explain the exis-
tence of vertical FDI better than a comparison of factor endowments. Thus,
increasing factor prices make the host country less attractive for the vertical
FDI. The labour force is the main input factor driving cost seeking FDI in
Central and Eastern Europe. Therefore we will expect labour costs to have
a negative impact on the vertical FDI.
Hypothesis 3: Falling transportation costs have a positive effect on vertical
but a negative effect on horizontal FDI.
Falling transportation costs decrease the total marginal costs for the vertical
separation of production, thus making vertical FDI more attractive. On the
other side, horizontal FDI becomes more attractive in comparison to exports
in case of increasing transportation costs.
Hypothesis 4: Large investment flows induce more horizontal and less
vertical FDI.
Following the argumentation of the model, large FDI inflows increase the
local factor prices and make the host country less attractive for vertical FDI.
On the other side, as the literature on FDI and growth argue, FDI inflows
contribute to growth of the host country, making it more attractive for market
seeking horizontal FDI.37
35See Helpman (1984).
36See Markusen et al. (1996), Markusen and Maskus (2001) and Carr et al. (2001).
37See Borensztein et. al (1998). We do not consider agglomeration effects, since it is
not clear, what type of FDI would benefit more from the agglomeration.
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3.4.2 Estimation
The estimation equations for the proof of the hypotheses is partially based
on the literature but also contains some improvements in order to catch the
special features of the model. In particular, the contribution is the incorpo-
ration of the share of vertical and horizontal FDI as a dependent variable.
We estimate the following specification using data over time (t) and country
(i) for German investments in CEE:
V FDIit/HFDIit = α+ β1 ∗GDPit + β2 ∗GDPCAPit +
+ β3 ∗ ULCDIFFit + β4 ∗ INFRAit +
+ β5 ∗ FDITOGDPit + βi + µit (3.18)
In equation (3.18) the dependent variable is derived from the firm survey
data, while the explanatory variables describe the country characteristics and
come from different official sources.38 On the right hand side, the variable
V FDIit is the number of vertical and HFDIit the number of horizontal FDI
projects for each country and year. We use a ratio as the dependent vari-
able, since the absolute number of projects will indicate the attractiveness
of a particular country for both types of FDI.39 Testing the share of vertical
projects on the total number of projects would put additional restrictions on
the estimation technique, since the dependent variable would range between
zero and one. Furthermore, using this ratio allows to test the time pattern
of FDI as shown by the cross in Figure (3.2) on page 50. As discussed above,
we use the number of projects and not the sales of affiliates because the infor-
mation on sales is only available for the last year due to cross section design
of the data set. The volume of FDI can not be used since the firms reported
the cumulated investment volume since the establishment of the affiliate.
38See Table 3.3 for description of variables and data sources.
39An additional reason is property of the cross section data, because the absolute number
of projects depends on the time, when firm survey was conducted.
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On the right hand side of the equation (3.18) the first two regressors GDP
and GDPCAP are measuring the market size of the host country. The first
variable is the country nominal GDP in USD terms, the second is per capita
GDP, in USD at PPP. While the first coefficient describes the total size of
the host market, the second is measuring the purchasing power. This is a
similar approach to Hanson et al. (2002), who do not include the size of the
US market but only the size of the host market measured by nominal GDP
and GDP per capita. The variable ULCDIFF captures production costs in
the foreign country. It is a difference between unit labour costs in the host
country and in Germany, where unit labour costs data is an index, beginning
with 100 points. Thus, the difference is positive, if the ULC in the host coun-
try grow faster than in Germany. The variable FDITOGDP is the ratio of
cumulated FDI inflows from the previous year to GDP. It captures the effect
of FDI inflows on the input prices and local wages, and therefore on vertical
and horizontal FDI. The next variable, INFRA is a number of telephone
lines per thousand inhabitants in the host country. This is a measurement
of the infrastructure quality and thus a proxy for the transportation costs.40
TIME is a time variable to capture possible time effects.
We do not include the size of the German market in the estimation for
two reasons: first, including the total size of the home market would make
sense if we consider all vertical FDI from Germany. Focusing on particular
regions (here CEE) would miss out the possibility for shifting the cost seeking
production to other cheaper locations. This could lead to wrong conclusion,
when vertical FDI to CEE falls, while the total demand from Germany for
vertical disintegration is growing, because it is served by the production from
other regions. Thus, the studies by Carr et al. (2001) and Braconier et al.
40Transportation costs is a product of distance and price. Because the first component
is constant and is captured by the country dummy, transportation costs are mainly in-
fluenced by the quality of the infrastructure. Thus, infrastructure is the best proxy for
the transportation costs, since there is no data on transportation costs available for each
country and year.
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(2002) on US and Swedish FDI respectively, include the size of the home mar-
ket, but cover all relevant regions for US or Swedish FDI. Second, Germany
is the only home country for the FDI in the data set, and, as Braconier et al.
(2002) pointed out, including only one home country will bias the results.
In the empirical tests we also do not employ wages as measurement of
labour costs for two reasons: it does not explicitly include changes of pro-
ductivity and is also correlated with the GDP per capita, since wages are
a good proxy for the purchasing power. To capture the decline in industry
production in the beginning of 1990s we excluded the observations before
1993 from the estimation in the preliminary tests. The coefficients had the
same sign, however the explanatory power measured by adjusted R2 fell. In
addition, number of observation felt to only 71.
We estimate equation (3.18) on a panel of cross-country observations over
the period from 1989 to 2000. For each of the 13 CEE countries we have at
least 7 to 8 observation points. Table 5.6 gives the description of the data
and sources. As estimation technique we employ fixed effects regression by
introducing country dummies.41 The estimation method does not employ
the log terms, since pretests have shown, that in case of using the log values
the most variables becomes less significant while obtaining the same signs.
Thus, since there are no explicit reasons to assume a falling relationship we
do not use the log terms. Using the ratio of FDI types and the country data
from the same year puts an implicit assumption, that FDI decision is taken
on the current information basis and was not carried out over a longer period
of time. This is not a perfect solution for long term investments like FDI.
However, a relatively short observation period does not allow to use large
time lags.
41Wooldridge (2001).
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3.4.3 Results and Discussion
The equation (3.18) was tested with different numbers of explanatory vari-
ables, presented as specifications (1) to (4) in Tables 3.4 and 3.5. In the
former table the dependent variable is the major definition of vertical FDI,
while the latter employs the export-oriented vertical FDI.42
Specification (1) in Table 3.4 includes the first two coefficients from the
equation (3.18) and a constant. Thus, the results are showing the role of
the market size on the composition of FDI flows, which is the key driving
force in the model. As both coefficients have negative signs, the market size
has a negative impact on the share of vertical FDI. A larger market leads to
less vertical but more horizontal FDI. It has primarily an effect on horizon-
tal FDI, since market size alone is not enough to oust vertical FDI, as for
example in China. This result is consistent with the theoretical predictions
and with earlier results by Brainard (1997) and Zhang and Markusen (2001):
a larger market makes it easier to cover fixed costs of plant for local sales
and thus encourages horizontal FDI. Therefore, the first hypothesis is clearly
supported, since the market size coefficients are robust and have the same
sign in all specifications.
However, the negative sign of GDP coefficients contradicts the empirical
results of Braconier et al. (2002), who show that export share on total sales
increases with the size of the host market. Although, the authors do not give
any explanation why the size of the host country have a positive impact on
the export share. The effect in Braconier et al. (2002) is very small, not
significant and has a negative sign if the fixed effect estimation technique
is used. The negative impact of the market size on vertical FDI is however
in line with the empirical study by Hanson et al. (2002), who estimates the
share of exports on total sales of the foreign affiliate to be negative correlated
with the market size of the host market.
42Country dummies are included in both estimations but not reported.
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Table 3.4: Regression Results: Vertical vs. Horizontal FDI
Dependent variable
(1) (2) (3) (4)
is V FDI/HFDI
GDP -2.35E-12* -2.58E-12** -2.15E-12 -1.67E-12
(-1.563) (-1.623) (-1.371) (-1.033)
GDPCAP -8.61E-05** -1.33E-04
(-1.336) (-1.060)
ULCDIFF -0.014** -0.014** -0.014*
(-1.778) (-1.687) (-1.685)
INFRA 0.017 0.076 0.140
(0.782) (0.333) (0.579)
FDITOGDP -1.033
(-0.537)
TIME -0.043
(-0.788)
Constant 3.082*** 0.631* 0.256 86.630
(2.096) (1.456) (0.413) (0.792)
R2 0.331 0.336 0.331 0.332
Adjusted R2 0.209 0.215 0.203 0.211
No. of observations 104 104 100 104
Note: Cell entries are OLS-fixed effects parameter estimates and t-statistics in paren-
theses. Country dummies are included in the estimation but not reported in the table.
Significance: *** significant at 5% level, ** significant at 10% level, * significant at 15%
level.
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Specification (2) includes all coefficients from the estimation equation.
The most important result here is the negative and significant coefficient
ULCDIFF : if the labour force in the host country becomes more expensive
relative to Germany, the share of cost seeking vertical FDI decreases, as
predicted by the theoretical model. Using unit labour costs we compare
total costs of labour, thus controlling not only for the labour costs but also
for the productivity. The ULC difference to Germany shows to what extent
cost advantage of the particular country influences the share of cost seeking
vertical FDI.
The coefficient for infrastructure INFRA, which is a proxy for the trans-
portation costs has the expected sign but is not significant. The positive
sign is consistent with theoretical predictions on transportation costs: bet-
ter infrastructure means lower transportation costs, thus attracting vertical
and discouraging horizontal FDI. Investigating this variable, we found that
it is correlated with the market size variable (correlation coefficient is 0.75),
which lead to a problem of multicollinearity and thus to insignificant infras-
tructure coefficient. The reason is that this coefficient could be also related
to the purchasing power in each market, since number of telephone lines is
also an indication for life quality. Braconier et al. (2002) face the same mul-
ticollinearity problem.
In the next step we control for the accumulation of FDI and for the time
pattern. Our model predicts, that larger FDI inflows increase the local fac-
tor prices and thus lead to less vertical FDI. The results for the coefficient
FDITOGDP support this, as the ratio of FDI to the GDP of the host
country has a negative sign as expected. The same situation occurs with
the TIME coefficient, which has the expected negative sign but is not sig-
nificant. A possible explanation for the low significance could be the short
period of time, since both coefficients are measuring an indirect effect on
vertical FDI while FDI is a long term decision.
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Since the theoretical model focused on the export-oriented vertical FDI,
Table 3.5 presents estimation results with export oriented (backward) vertical
FDI as the dependent variable. Additionally we control for the time effect by
including year dummies. Using this type of vertical FDI gives very similar
results to the general definition of vertical FDI, presented in Table 3.4. The
coefficients for the market size and relative labour costs maintain the negative
signs. They confirm the results discussed above, that a larger market and
higher production costs will reduce the share of vertical FDI. Surprisingly,
the coefficient for the infrastructure has a negative sign, however it is not
significant.
The goodness of fit measured by adjusted R2 is not very high for all spec-
ifications. It makes clear again, that the observation of the FDI Life Cycle
can be difficult empirically for several reasons. In the following we discuss
two of them, the rapid opening and the short observation period. First, a
rapid opening of CEE markets complicates the observation of change in com-
position of FDI inflows. As explained above, one would expect vertical FDI
to dominate at the beginning and then horizontal FDI to gain an increasing
share afterwords. But the new possibility to access already existing markets
even if they are relatively small will attract the market seeking horizontal
FDI to enter just after the opening. This will not change the basic idea of
consequent market entry for different FDI types, but make the estimation
procedure more difficult. This effect should be relevant especially for large
multinationals with ”deep pockets”, that do not look at the present situation
but at the future potential of the market. The more risk averse middle size
firms will only invest if the market size is enough to cover high fixed costs
for the market entry.
A further difficulty analysing this question with the current data set is
the very short time horizon. Foreign investors can officially invest in the
former socialistic countries only since 1989. The available data covers the
period from 1989 to 2001. So there are only 13 years, which is a short period
given that FDI is characterized by a long term strategy.
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Table 3.5: Regression Results: Backward Vertical vs. Horizontal FDI
Dependent variable is
(1) (2) (3)(backward VFDI)/HFDI
GDP -1.86E-12** -1.86E-12** -1.46E-12
(-1.673) (-1.653) (-1.268)
GDPCAP -1.57E-04* -1.52E-04**
(-2.519) (-1.793)
ULCDIFF -8.40E-05** -5.34E-05
(-0.143) (-0.086)
INFRA -0.015 -0.194
(-0.073) (-1.056)
FDITOGDP -1.498
(-1.056)
Constant 2.713*** 2.110*** 1.613***
(3.449) (4.720) (2.962)
R2 0.372 0.336 0.351
Adjusted R2 0.183 0.215 0.123
No. of observations 104 104 100
Note: Cell entries are OLS-fixed effects parameter estimates and t-statistics in parentheses.
Country dummies and year dummies are included in the estimation but not reported in
the table. Significance: *** significant at 5% level, ** significant at 10% level, * significant
at 15% level.
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Finally, the falling share of vertical FDI could be also induced by increased
local sourcing of the foreign affiliates, since foreign affiliates become more
independent from their parent company and more input goods and services
become available in the foreign market.
Overall, the estimation results provide a strong empirical support for the
”FDI Life Cycle” model. The composition of FDI inflows depends on country
size, but also on production and transportation costs. The hypotheses are
supported by empirical findings and the results are in line with comparable
empirical studies on vertical FDI.
3.5 Conclusion
The amount of FDI inflows into transition countries of Central and Eastern
Europe has been growing from year to year. At the same time, the charac-
teristics of the host countries have changed rapidly: markets for final goods
have become larger and prices for the intermediate goods and in particular
labour costs have increased. The composition of the FDI inflows has reacted
to such changes: while the cost seeking vertical FDI dominated in the be-
ginning, the share of horizontal FDI has been increasing over time. This
chapter investigated these changes in structure of FDI flows over time from
theoretical and empirical perspectives.
The theoretical model describes the dynamic interaction between vertical
and horizontal FDI in a tractable framework, thus explaining the composition
of FDI flows over time. The model incorporates both types of FDI and shows
that FDI inflows increase the price of the input good in the host country. The
growing price for the input good makes the country less attractive for cost
seeking vertical FDI, while at the same time the growing market attracts
more market seeking horizontal FDI. Thus, one should observe a high but
falling share of vertical FDI and an increasing share of horizontal FDI in
transition counties during the catching-up process.
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The idea of “FDI Life Cycle” is supported by empirical evidence for Ger-
man FDI in Central and Eastern Europe. While the share of vertical FDI
on total German FDI projects was constant in the beginning of the 1990s,
it has been continuously falling after 1996. Empirical tests for 13 transition
countries also indicate the changing structure of FDI inflows: the market size
of the host country and the unit labour costs have a negative impact on the
share of vertical FDI inflows.
Further analysis is necessary to evaluate the results after a longer period
of time, since FDI is a long term decision and can not respond very quickly
to rapid changes in country characteristics.
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3.6 Appendix: Mathematical Derivations
1. Condition for vertical FDI in case 2
For the geographical separation of production it must be cheaper to source
the input good from the foreign country, so the condition wf + t < wh must
hold. In order to get the size Af which fulfills this condition we insert the
prices for the intermediate goods in case 2 in the host country from equation
(3.5) and the price in the home country from equation (3.11). Solving the
inequality with respect to Ah gives the country size, under which it is cheaper
to source the input good production in the foreign country:
Af + Ah − t+ 2cf
4
+ t <
Ah + ch
2
(3.19)
Ah > Af + 3t+ 2 (ch − cf ) (3.20)
Q.E.D.
2. Condition for horizontal FDI
Horizontal FDI will only enter the market if its profits can cover the fixed
costs. Thus, the profit function in equation (3.13) must be positive. By
entering the quantities sold by the incumbent and by the new affiliate of
MNE from h we get:
Πh =
(
Af − 2Af − wf
3
− wf
)
Af − wf
3
− F fh ≥ 0 (3.21)
solving the inequality yields
(Af − wf )2
9
− F fh ≥ 0 (3.22)
and taking only positive values into account gives:
Af ≥ 3
√
F + wf (3.23)
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Inserting the price for the intermediate good in case of market entry from
the equation (3.17) gives:
Af ≥ 3
√
F +
4Af + 3Ah − 3t+ 7cf
14
(3.24)
10Af ≥ 42
√
F + 3Ah − 3t+ 7cf (3.25)
Af ≥ 4.2
√
F + 0.3Ah − 0.3t+ 0.7cf (3.26)
Q.E.D.
3. Condition for vertical FDI in case 3
The derivation is the same as for the case 2 and starts from the condition
wf + t < wh. The difference to case 2 is the new price for the input good in
foreign country f , which is taken from the equation (3.17):
4Af + 3Ah − 3t+ 7cf
14
+ t ≥ Ah + ch
2
(3.27)
Af ≥ Ah − 11
4
t+
7
4
(ch − cf ) (3.28)
Q.E.D.
4. Derivation of VFDI-curve in Figure 3.2
The VFDI curve in Figure 3.2 is an incentive for vertical FDI to enter the
foreign market. It is calculated as the difference between profits with sourcing
of input good abroad (vertical FDI) and in home country (local production):
Πv − ΠA = (Ah − qvh − wf − t)−
(
Ah − qA − wh
)
(3.29)
By inserting the quantities for autarky from equation (3.3) and for vertical
separation from equation(3.9) we obtain
Πv − ΠA =
(
Ah − wf − t
2
)2
−
(
Ah − wh
2
)2
(3.30)
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Now inserting the price function wf for each case gives the VFDI-curve
with respect to the size of the foreign market Af , as shown in Figure 3.2.
However, as the summary in Table 3.6 illustrates, the price function differs
for each case, since we have a different number of final good producers. Thus,
the incentive function must be derived for each case separately.
Table 3.6: Price Function for the Input Good: Summary
cases (2a) (2b) (3) (4)
wf
Ah − t+ cf
2
Af + Ah − t+ 2cf
4
4Af + 3Ah − 3t+ 7cf
14
Af + cf
2
For the case 2 one has to differentiate between two stages. In a very
small foreign market there is no local producer of the final good because of
low demand in combination with high production costs due to high demand
for the input good from country h. So the price for the input good is only
determined by the demand from the country h. It is identical to the price
in autarky. As presented in column (2a) of Table 3.6, this price does not
depend on the size of the foreign market, so the incentive curve is horizontal.
The threshold level of the market size with no local producer of final good in
the foreign country can be derived from the profit function of the final good
producer in the foreign country:
Πnf =
(
Af − qnf − wf
)
qf ≥ 0 (3.31)
(
Af − Af − wf
2
− wf
)(
Af − wf
2
)
≥ 0 (3.32)
(
Af − wf
2
)2
≥ 0 (3.33)
Now we insert the price for the input good from the column (2a). It is derived
as in the case of autarky and equals to
Ah−wf−t
2
. Then solving the equation
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for positive values gives
1
4
(3Af − Ah + t− 2cf )2 ≥ 0 (3.34)
Aˆf ≥ Ah − t+ 2cf
3
(3.35)
If the foreign market is smaller than Aˆf , there is no final good production
in the foreign country (column 2a).
i.) Incentive function for the case 2a:
Inserting wf from the column (2a) and wh from (3.5) in (3.29) gives:
Πv − ΠA = 1
4
(
Ah − Ah − t+ cf
2
− t
)2
− 1
4
(
Ah − Ah + ch
2
− t
)2
=
=
1
4
(
Ah − t− cf
2
)2
− 1
4
(
Ah − ch
2
)2
=
=
1
16
[
(t+ cf )
2 − 2Ah (t+ cf ) + 2Ahch − c2h
]
(3.36)
The final form of equation (3.36) does not contain the size of the foreign
market Af , so the incentive line VFDI in Figure 3.2 is horizontal for small
market size (Af < Aˆf ).
ii.) Incentive function for the case (2b):
For a larger market size in case 2 (Af > Aˆf ) there is a local producer of
final goods in the foreign country. Therefore, we insert the new price for the
input good from equation (3.11) into the incentive for vertical FDI inequation
(3.30).
Πv − ΠA = 1
4
(
Ah − Af + Ah − t+ 2cf
4
− t
)2
−
− 1
4
(
Ah − Ah + ch
2
− t
)2
=
=
1
16
[(
3Ah − Af − 3t− 2cf
2
)2
− (Ah − ch)2
] (3.37)
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The first derivation of equation (3.37) with respect to market size Af
gives
∂
(
Πv − ΠA)
∂Af
=
1
32
(Af − 3Ah + 3t+ 2cf ) < 0 (3.38)
is negative for the sufficiently small size of the foreign market (Af <
3Ah − 3t− 2cf ). Thus, the incentive function for vertical FDI is falling with
respect to market size.
iii.) Incentive function for the case 3:
The same procedure for the new price function wf gives:
Πv − ΠA = 1
4
(
Ah − 4Af + 3Ah − 3t+ 7cf
14
− t
)2
−
− 1
4
(
Ah − Ah + ch
2
− t
)2
=
=
1
16
[(
11Ah − 4Af − 11t− 7cf
49
)2
− (Ah − ch)2
] (3.39)
Again, the derivation is negative
∂
(
Πv − ΠA)
∂Af
=
1
98
(4Af − 11Ah + 11t+ 7cf ) < 0 (3.40)
for sufficiently small size of the foreign market.
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Chapter 4
Employment Effects of Vertical
and Horizontal FDI
4.1 Introduction
The large increase of foreign direct investment (FDI) flows during the last
decade was accompanied by growing unemployment in the home countries of
multinational enterprises (MNE). This has led to a broad discussion about
the employment effects of FDI. With the liberalisation of the Central and
Eastern European (CEE) countries MNE’s got access to a cheap labour force
and new sales markets. In Germany, as a neighbour to this region, both
developments created the fear, German multinational firms would use cheap
labour in CEE countries and reallocate labour intensive production to this
region.1 However, the impact of FDI on employment depends substantially
on the type and motivation of foreign activity. It is well discussed in the
literature that, for example, cost seeking investments lead to reallocation
and therefore have a much bigger impact on home employment than market
seeking FDI. Thus, in order to analyse the employment effects of foreign in-
vestments this chapter differentiates between two main types of foreign direct
1In a similar context the trade literature also deals with job losses through imports,
see for example Kletzer (2002) and Kucera and Milberg (2002).
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investments: horizontal and vertical FDI.2
Conducting horizontal investments abroad, MNE duplicates the same
production activity in the other country. The models of horizontal MNE
include Markusen (1984), Horstmann and Markusen (1987) and Markusen
(1995). Horizontal MNE’s dominate when countries are similar in size and in
relative factor endowments, while trade costs are moderately high (Markusen
et al., 1996). Here the MNE expand the production capacity abroad instead
of building up the capacity at home and exporting the goods. Therefore with
horizontal FDI one would expect a substitution effect of foreign investment
on the labour demand in the home country. However, this substitutional re-
lationship exists only in case of tradable goods and low transportation costs,
since in case of non-tradable goods the MNE could not serve the new market
by exports. In such a case, establishing a new affiliate in the other country
would have no negative or even positive effects on the employment in the
home country.
In case of vertical FDI multinationals separate the activities geographi-
cally by stages of production. Theoretical models of vertical separation were
introduced by Helpman (1984) and Helpman and Krugman (1985). The
theory predicts a dominant role of vertical multinationals in countries with
different relative factor endowments, which is the case in most CEE countries
compared to Western Europe. The separation typically occurs on the basis
of factor intensities. The MNE locates, for example, skilled labour intensive
activities in countries with large endowment of skilled labour. In case of
vertical multinationals, foreign production is complementary to the produc-
tion at home. Higher production in the foreign affiliate means higher labour
demand in the home country. Substitution of employment occurs here in the
initial stage, when the multinational reallocate existing production stages
abroad.
2The third alternative is the “Knowledge Capital Model” proposed by Markusen and
Maskus (2002), which incorporates the first two. See Chapter 2 for detailed discussion.
78
For the analysis of employment effect it is necessary to differentiate be-
tween marginal and absolute effects. Marginal effects are based on the as-
sumption of existing plants at home and abroad and describe changes in
employment in the home country, when there is a change in wages in the
foreign affiliate. In contrast, absolute effects measure the total number of
reallocated jobs from the home country, including plant shut downs and re-
allocation of production stages from the home to the foreign country. The
main focus of this chapter is on marginal effects of German FDI in Central
and Eastern Europe.
Previous empirical studies on employment effects of FDI can be grouped
following this differentiation. The first group calculates absolute effects of for-
eign investments on labour demand in the home country of investing firms.
Kno¨dler (1999) surveys this literature and undertakes descriptive calcula-
tions of absolute job losses for the German labour market.3 The second
group of studies explores marginal effects of wage changes in one location of
MNE on labour demand in other locations. Here Brainard and Riker (1997a,
1997b) investigate whether US multinationals reduce labour demand at home
when they expand production abroad. Using firm-level data authors estimate
labour demand equations within the firm and show that affiliate activities
in developing countries are complements rather than substitutes for labour
demand in the US.
While Brainard and Riker (1997b) employ educational levels in order to
distinguish between different types of host countries, Braconier and Ekholm
(2000) use differences in wage levels for the same purpose. They estimate
cross-elasticities of labour demand within the Swedish multinational firms
and show, that wage changes in one location affect labour demand in another
location of multinational enterprises. In particular, Braconier and Ekholm
(2000) find a substitutional relationship between employment in Sweden and
3See section 4.6 for detailed survey of this literature.
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other high-wage countries. On the other hand, the labour demand in affil-
iates with low wage-levels is complementary. Both results support the idea
of this chapter, since horizontal FDI dominates in industrialised countries
and the share of vertical FDI is higher in low wage countries.4 In the second
paper, Braconier and Ekholm (2001) investigate the employment effects of
Swedish FDI with regard to the opening of Eastern European markets. They
found a small positive employment effect on Swedish labour market, while
there is a negative substitution effect for the Southern European countries
like Spain and Portugal. Finally, these results were supported by Konings
and Murphy (2001), who studied similar question using a large data set of
European multinationals and they foreign affiliates. The empirical results
show that the job reallocation takes place mainly between parents and affili-
ates in other EU based affiliates and not between parents and their low cost
Eastern European based subsidiaries. Furthermore, as one would expect the
reallocation was observed in the manufacturing sector but not in the service
sector. Konings and Murphy (2001) also pointed to a dominant role of hori-
zontal FDI in Central Eastern Europe.
Thus, previous literature does not discriminate between different types
of foreign investments while investigating the employment effects. Although,
some studies make indirect interpretations, assuming for example, that coun-
tries with low wages or education attract only vertical FDI. Other studies
come to the conclusion, that complementarity of employment points to verti-
cal type of FDI. But overall, lack of data did not allow to distinguish between
vertical and horizontal FDI among investment flows to one region. On the
other hand, as argued before, different types of investment have different
motivations and different impacts on employment. From this perspective,
the main objective of this chapter is to explore these differences in impact
of vertical and horizontal FDI on employment in the home country of the
multinational firm.
4See Markusen (1995) and Markusen and Maskus (2001).
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In the next section a theoretical model explores the relationship between
labour demand in different locations of the MNE depending on the type of
investment. Then, in sections 3 and 4 the results from the theoretical model
will be empirically estimated for each type of FDI separately. In order to
conduct separate estimations for vertical and horizontal FDI, the empirical
part also develops three ways to distinguish between these types of FDI and
gives the main characteristics of each investment type.
4.2 Model of Cross Border Employment Ef-
fects
The model is based on the theoretical framework developed by Brainard and
Riker (1997) and by Braconier and Ekholm (2000). In comparison to the
former, our model differentiates between vertical and horizontal FDI. The
advancement to the latter is the use of cost minimisation approach, which
allows exploring labour demand given the output of MNE. The primary ob-
jective of the model is to illustrate the differences in cross border employment
effects of vertical and horizontal FDI.
Consider a multinational enterprise with affiliates in two countries h and
f . The firm faces the following demand function for the final product Qi in
country i:
Qi = Yi − Pi, i ∈ h, f (4.1)
where Yi is aggregate demand and Pi is price in country i. For simplicity
we exclude exports of final goods from the model, so that the market i can
not be served through foreign production. The production of the final good
requires two intermediate goods A and B, that are produced with input
factors labour L and capital K. The firm employs a two-stage production
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technology, with a Cobb-Douglas production function in the first stage5
Ai = L
α
i,AK
β
i,A, Bi = L
α
i,BK
β
i,B, 0 < α < 1, 0 < β < 1 (4.2)
and a fixed-proportions production function of Leontief type in the second
stage:
Qi = min [Ai, Bi] (4.3)
The Cobb-Douglas-Production function has, by assumption, constant re-
turns to scale, α + β = 1. In contrast to previous studies, this model dif-
ferentiates between two sectors in one country for better illustration of local
effects in case of vertical FDI.
The production of intermediate goods requires different types of labour,
LA and LB, thus excluding the substitution between labour producing differ-
ent intermediate goods. In addition labour is assumed to be immobile across
countries, which is a standard assumption in related literature. As a conse-
quence, the firm faces wages wAi and w
B
i for production of input goods A and
B in country i.6 In the final goods market the MNE acts under perfect com-
petition in both countries. In case of vertical FDI, there is intra-firm trade in
intermediate goods with transportation costs of the “iceberg” type t.7 The
costs of capital r are assumed to be the same for both sectors and countries.
This simplifying assumption enables us to concentrate on wage effects and
is supported by the empirical findings about the form of FDI financing in
CEE.8 Considering different wages and transportation costs between coun-
5Previous studies used Leontieff-Production-Function in both stages. The advantage
of Cobb-Douglas is the exact calculation of the interaction between wages and labour
demand.
6For simplicity we assume, that wages are exogenous and are not affected by the labour
demand of the firm.
7If tG was shipped from one country only G arrives the other country, where t > 1.
8Marin et al. (2002) show that German investors relocate internal financial resources
or take credits in Germany to finance the investments in CEE and therefore faces very
similar costs of capital.
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tries the MNE decomposes production across borders to minimize the cost
function:9
C =
∑
i
[
rβγ
(
Ai
(
(1 + ti,j)w
A
i
)α
+Bi
(
(1 + ti,j)w
B
i
)α)]
(4.4)
where γ = (α/β)β + (α/β)−β and i ∈ h, f . Equation (4.4) is the sum of
labour and capital costs in different locations and is computed as lowest cost
for given output. The cost function in equation (4.4) illustrates the general
case, when affiliates in both countries produce the intermediate goods for
the local market and for export. Therefore, transportation costs t for the
intermediate goods are also included besides the price for each factor.
The total labour demand of the firm depends on labour costs wi, costs
of capital ri, the total quantity Qi and in case of intra-firm trade on trans-
portation costs ti. The labour demand function has the general form:
Li = fi (wi, ri, Qi, ti) i ∈ h, f (4.5)
In the next section we will derive the labour demand function for hor-
izontal and vertical division of production separately, in order to show the
cross border relationship of labour demand for each type of FDI. Thus, the
question is now, what are the marginal effects of increasing wages in one
country on the labour demand in the other country?
4.2.1 Horizontal Division of Production
To generate the special case of a horizontal division of production in this
model the following restrictions have to be satisfied: high transportation
costs for intermediate goods and similar local wages in both countries. Both
conditions follow the theoretical literature on horizontal FDI.10 In this situ-
ation the costs of local production of intermediate goods are lower than the
costs of foreign production and importing:
9See Section 1 in Appendix 4.7 for derivation. For another approach of cost minimisa-
tion for two plants see Gravelle and Rees (1994).
10See for example Brainard (1997) and Markusen (1995).
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thfw
A
h > w
A
f , thfw
A
f > w
A
h
thfw
B
h > w
B
f , thfw
B
f > w
B
h
If transportation costs are taken into account, it is not profitable to have
an intra firm trade in intermediate goods. In order to guarantee the pro-
duction of the final good in both countries, we assume that for any relevant
values of wAi , w
B
i there is a sufficient demand for the final good in each coun-
try. Consequently, affiliates in both countries serve only their local market
and therefore act independently from each other.11 Then, the total labour
demand in country i is a sum of labour demands necessary for production of
both intermediate goods A and B in country i and equals to:12
Li =
(
α
β
) β
α+β
Q
1
α+β
i
((
r
wAi
) β
α+β
+
(
r
wBi
) β
α+β
)
(4.6)
Now taking the first derivations with respect to the relevant variables
we can show, how labour demand in each location depends on local wages,
interest rates and output:
∂Li
∂wAi
< 0,
∂Li
∂wBi
< 0,
∂Li
∂Qi
> 0, i, j ∈ h, f ; i 6= j
As expected, higher output of final goods or lower wages lead to higher em-
ployment. On the other hand, wage changes in one country do not influence
employment in the other country, since their are not contained in the labour
demand function (4.6):
∂Li
∂wAj
= 0,
∂Li
∂wBj
= 0,
∂Li
∂Qj
= 0, i, j ∈ h, f ; i 6= j
Therefore, the main result for horizontal FDI is the absence of marginal
effects of wage changes on employment in the foreign affiliate. Thus, em-
ployment abroad is neither substitute nor complement for employment in
11Note, that since there is no trade in final goods firms can not supply the foreign market
through exports.
12See Section 2 in Appendix 4.7 for derivation.
84
the home country. This result relies on absence of exports, which is a realis-
tic feature for investments in particular in non-manufacturing sectors.
Following the logic for marginal effects, the absolute effect of wage changes,
i.e. the reallocation of jobs to other country, depends on the level of trans-
portation costs for the final good. As discussed in Brainard (1997), for low
transportation costs labour demands in both countries are substitutes: final
goods can be produced in the home country and exported. In this case the
production capacity in the foreign country is either relocated from the home
country or is built abroad instead of additional capacity in the home country.
In the opposite case with very high transportation costs the absolute effect is
rather positive: the firm must produce abroad to be able to serve the foreign
market at all. The overall production volume is higher than in the case of
exports and reduces the share of overhead costs. This makes the final good
cheaper in the home market and leads therefore to higher labour demand in
the home country.
4.2.2 Vertical Division of Production
Without loss of generality the following restrictions are necessary to gener-
ate the appearance of vertical FDI in this model. Following Markusen and
Maskus (2002) it is assumed, that wages differ between countries h and f and
transportation costs thf are low. The wages in country f for the production
of intermediate good B are assumed to be lower than in country h:
thfw
B
f < w
B
h
Then, even taking transportation costs into account, the MNE finds it
more profitable to produce intermediate good B exclusively in country f and
to export it to the country h. Thus, the multinational shifts the complete
production of input good B to country f . By assumption, wages for the
other intermediate good A are still similar in both countries:
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thfw
A
h > w
A
f , thfw
A
f > w
A
h
Now the affiliate in the country h produces A for the local demand and
imports the input good B, necessary to produce the amount Qh of the final
good. The labour demand of the firm in the country h can be derived in the
similar way as the equation (4.6) and equals to
Lh =
(
α
β
) β
α+β
Q
1
α+β
h
(
r
wAh
) β
α+β
(4.7)
which is the employment necessary to produce only the intermediate good
A in country h. Obviously, differentiation of equation (4.7) with respect to
wages and output shows that labour demand in country h depends negatively
on local wages and positively on output of the final good in h:
∂Lh
∂wAh
< 0,
∂Lh
∂Qh
> 0,
However, in contrast to the horizontal case, the MNE imports the inter-
mediate good B produced in country f in order to produce the output Qh.
Therefore, labour demand Lh in the home country h depends also directly
on wages wf and transportation costs tfh. Differentiating the labor demand
function illustrates, that higher wages abroad and higher transportation costs
lead to less employment at home in case of vertical specialisation:13
∂Lh
∂wBf
< 0,
∂Lh
∂tfh
< 0
The intuition behind this result is following: If wages in country f or the
transportation costs tfh increase, the final good in country h becomes more
expensive. From the demand function (4.1) we see that sales of final good
falls. Thus, the demand for intermediate good A produced in h also goes
down and thus the demand for local labour in h decreases.
13See Section 3 in Appendix 4.7 for mathematical proof.
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Now we turn to the other affiliate in country f . It produces both in-
termediate goods A and B for the local demand and the input good B for
the country h14. Therefore, the labour demand in country f is the sum of
labour needed for the local production of both intermediate goods A, B and
for export of the intermediate good B.
Lf =
(
α
β
) β
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Differentiating the labour demand function with respect to output, wages
and transportation costs gives:
∂Lf
∂Qf
> 0,
∂Lf
∂Qh
> 0,
∂Lf
∂wAf
< 0,
∂Lf
∂wBf
< 0,
∂Lf
∂tfh
< 0
As expected, labour demand in country f depends positively on local
demand for the final good and on demand for the final good in country h,
but negatively on local wages. Furthermore, labour demand in country f
depends on wages in the home country h. The motivation and the proof
are the same as for the affiliate in country h. A wage increase in h leads to
higher costs and lower sales of the final goods Qh in the home country of
MNE. Consequently, the demand for the intermediate good B and imports
from f decrease and the employment in f falls. Therefore wage changes in
h lead to changes in labour demand in f :15
∂Lf
∂wAh
< 0
As the differentiation results from the equations (4.7) and (4.8) illustrate,
in case of vertical FDI labour demand in one country depends on wages in
14It is possible to model an extreme case with no local demand for the final good in f .
Then, the affiliate in f produces only the one input factor for the market in h.
15Mathematical proof is identical to the previous case of country f , which is presented
in Section 3, Appendix 4.7.
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the other country. Higher wages in the foreign country mean lower labour
demand in foreign and in the home country. The same relationship holds in
other direction too. Therefore, the main result is that the vertical diversifica-
tion of production implements a complementarity of labour demand within
the MNE. This complementarity effect can be observed as a marginal effect
between parent companies and existing foreign affiliates in case of relatively
small wage changes. The absolute effect can nevertheless be negative. In case
of large differences in wage levels between countries, MNE has an incentive
to reallocate complete production stages to the cheapest location. In our
model, the complete production of the intermediate good B was located in
the country f . Such reallocation should be observed after the opening of the
new markets with strong differences in factor endowments, as it was the case
in Central and Eastern Europe.
To summarize the results from the theoretical model, the type of foreign
investment makes a significant difference on the cross border employment
effects. Horizontal FDI creates completely independent labour demand in
both countries. In contrast, vertical FDI leads to a direct relationship be-
tween wages and output in one country and the labour demand in another.
However, this marginal effects of foreign activity on the home employment
can differ from the absolute effects.
4.3 Empirical Evidence
The empirical part of this chapter is based on the data set of 400 German
multinational enterprises with investment projects in Central and Eastern
Europe (CEE).16 The data set includes main characteristics about the Ger-
man parent firm and its CEE affiliates like sales, employment and wages.
It also contains the information about intra-firm trade with final and inter-
16For description of the data set see Chapter 1.3.
88
mediate goods between parent company and its CEE affiliates. Using this
information it is possible for the first time to differentiate between vertical
and horizontal investments at the firm level and conduct the analysis sepa-
rately for both types of FDI.
4.3.1 Empirical Definitions of Vertical and Horizontal
FDI
As mentioned in the introduction, previous empirical studies on labour ef-
fects of FDI did not differentiate between vertical and horizontal FDI in their
estimations. However, this differentiation was conducted in the theoretical
literature on multinational enterprises. This literature employed macro crite-
ria like trade costs, differences in relative or absolute factor endowments and
investment barriers to distinguish between different types of FDI.17 These cri-
teria were employed in empirical analysis of FDI on the macro level. Several
empirical studies at the firm level also used these criteria in order to explain
whether vertical or horizontal FDI dominates among investment flows to a
particular region, however, without looking at each investment project.18 Fi-
nally, some empirical studies differentiate between the two types of FDI by
making very general assumptions.19
Therefore, in order to estimate labour demand for the two types of FDI we
will first derive the criteria for the separation between vertical and horizontal
investments on the firm level. To identify each type of investment we use
the definitions of vertical and horizontal multinational enterprise and indica-
tors proposed in recent empirical studies. Since there are many possibilities
17Helpman and Krugman (1985), Markusen et al. (1996), Markusen and Maskus (2001).
Brainard and Riker (1997) used differences in education level to differentiate between
countries.
18See for example Markusen and Maskus (2002).
19For example Hansson (2001) uses a rough classification of FDI by assuming, that
Swedish FDI in non-OECD countries are vertical.
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to do so, this section develops three possible separation methods.20 Using
all three definitions for the further empirical analysis enables us to build on
results from different strands of previous literature, shed more light on the
differences between vertical and horizontal FDI and test the robustness of
empirical estimations.
The three methods are shown in Table 4.1, which contains criteria for each
method and the share of vertical and horizontal FDI in the sample according
to each method. The first approach to differentiate between vertical and
horizontal FDI (typeI) is based on the theoretical definition of vertical FDI
presented in the introduction and relies on the input-output relationship
between parent company and its foreign affiliate, as initially proposed by
Helpman (1984) and Helpman and Krugman (1985). The firm is defined to
be vertically integrated, if the foreign affiliate receives a substantial share of
input goods from the parent company or sends its output to German parent,
otherwise it is a horizontal FDI.
A similar method was proposed by Braconier and Ekholm (2001) as they
employed the information about goods, that foreign affiliates of Swedish firms
send to Sweden. However, they do not distinguish whether these goods were
sent to the parent company for further production or sold at the Swedish
market. In a related paper Braconier et al. (2002) refer to an investment of
vertical type, if the foreign affiliate exports to the parent´s home country or
to a third country. The typeI-definition incorporates these two sources. In
addition, the intra-firm trade in both directions is relevant, since it can be a
forward or backward integration of production21. The threshold level for the
share of intermediate goods received from or sent back to the parent company
is 50 percent. Such a high share ensures, that substantial part of the affil-
20See Braconier et al. (2002) for different types of vertical and Markusen (1995) for
horizontal FDI.
21See Head (2002) and the Introduction of the thesis for detailed discussion.
90
iate works in a vertically fragmented production chain.22 Preliminary tests
have shown a low sensitivity of the 50 percent level, which guarantees stable
empirical results, since moving the threshold to other levels like 30 or 70
percent does not lead to significant changes (under 5 percent) in distribution
of investments among the two types.
Table 4.1: Empirical Definitions and Shares of Vertical and Horizontal FDI,
in Percent
Definition Criteria
Share*
horizontal vertical
FDI is of vertical type if:
type I > 50% of input come from parent or 64 36
> 50% of output sold to parent
type II < 100% of output sold on the local 51 41
market
type III > 50% of output exported 71 27
Source: Sample of 1,050 German FDI projects in CEE.
Note: * Share on surveyed German FDI in CEE. Shares do not add to 100 percent due to
missing values.
The next method to distinguish between different types of investment
(typeII) is based on the market orientation of the foreign affiliate. It defines
horizontal investment if the foreign affiliate is completely market oriented
i.e. exclusively serves the local market, otherwise it is a vertical FDI. This
definition dates back to an empirical study by Lankes and Venables (1997),
who differentiate between the two types of FDI on the basis of investment
22In some cases, after setting up a foreign plant, the parent company supports the
new affiliate with management know-how and with input goods. After some time the
affiliate becomes more independent and buys the inputs from local suppliers or directly
from suppliers of the parent company. High share of input goods from the parent company
will exclude this effect from our estimation.
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motives. They refer to horizontal FDI if it is market oriented, so the for-
eign affiliate was set up to serve the local market only. Vertical FDI is cost
oriented: The affiliate produces in the foreign country in order to use cheap
labour for export or for further production in the parent company, as pro-
posed by Hanson et al. (2001). Therefore, as Table 4.1 shows, definition of
typeII identifies a horizontal FDI if the affiliate sells his complete output in
the foreign country. In all other cases it is a vertical FDI.
The third definition (typeIII) is a mixture of the first two: FDI project
is called vertical, if more than 50 percent of output are exported. In all
other cases it is a horizontal FDI. This definition includes market orientation
on the one hand and exploitation of country specific cost advantages on the
other hand.
In order to verify the definitions of horizontal and vertical investment
we consider the motivation of both investment types. In the survey Ger-
man investors were asked for the motivation behind the decision to conduct
each investment project. The results are presented in Table 4.2 for all three
definition. As we would expect from the theoretical literature, both types
of FDI are driven by strongly different motivations. While for horizontal
FDI market entry and market proximity are most important, vertical FDI is
characterised by interest in low production costs and qualified labour force.
The differences in motivation for vertical and horizontal FDI remain strong
for all three types of definition, even when the size of the difference varies
slightly. Overall, the differences between the two types of FDI with respect to
motivation of investment confirms the introduced definitions of vertical and
horizontal FDI. The motivation results are even clearer than the findings of
Lankes and Venables (1997).
A further difference to previous studies on vertical and horizontal FDI is
the inclusion of service providers in the analysis of vertical and horizontal
FDI. The reason is that even among investors from the non-manufacturing
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Table 4.2: Motivation for Vertical and Horizontal FDI
Definitions: type I type II type III
horiz. vert. horiz. vert. horiz. vert.
Low production costs 3.2 3.2 4.1 1.8 3.8 1.9
Qualified labour force 3.6 3.4 4.0 2.4 3.8 3.1
Access to market 1.7 2.2 1.5 1.9 1.5 2.9
Market size 2.2 2.7 2.0 2.3 2.1 3.5
Source: Sample of 1,050 German FDI projects in CEE.
Note: The valuation ranges from 1 for “very important” to 5 for “absolutely not impor-
tant”.
sector, the share of vertical FDI varies between 19 and 30 percent depending
on definition. It is not surprising, that the share of vertical FDI is signifi-
cantly higher in manufacturing industries. But given a high share of vertical
FDI among service providers, the non-manufacturing sector should not be
excluded from the estimation.
4.3.2 Vertical and Horizontal FDI in CEE
Using the three definitions developed in the previous section, the surveyed
investments in Central and Eastern Europe can be separated into vertical
and horizontal type. Table 4.1 on page 91 reports the share of both FDI
types for each definition.23 Depending on the definition type, the share of
vertical FDI in CEE ranges between 27 and 41 percent. The first definition
based on the intra-firm trade gives 36 percent, while the market oriented
definition of typeII reaches 41 percent. The latter should overestimate the
real number, since some market oriented horizontal affiliates also serve the
markets in the neighbour countries.
All three numbers are relatively high in comparison to previous studies.
23For other measurement of vertical integration in CEE see Marin et al. (2002).
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For example Markusen and Maskus (2002) predict an overwhelming role for
horizontal FDI for industrialised countries. Konings and Murphy (2001) see
horizontal FDI dominating in the CEE countries too. However, a high share
of vertical FDI in this region is not surprising when compared to the pre-
dictions from the theoretical literature.24 There is a large wage gap between
Germany and CEE countries, while the distances and transportation costs
are relatively small compared to other low cost regions of the world.25 These
characteristics make CEE very attractive to place the labour intensive pro-
duction of German firms and thus explain a high share of vertical FDI.
Now we turn to the composition of investment flows to each country.
Table 4.3 presents the share of horizontal and vertical investments on total
FDI inflows for major FDI recipients countries in CEE. The share of vertical
FDI in Central European accession countries ranges between 30 percent in
Hungary and 45 percent in Slovenia (typeI). Thus, about one third of all
investments in the main host countries for German FDI in CEE are vertical.26
In the most South European countries the share of vertical investments is
even higher. In accordance with the theoretical models a high share in this
region can be explained by low wages and short distances to Germany. Thus,
these countries are more likely to be used for labour intensive production of
German multinationals. Other outlying regions like the CIS countries have
also a relatively high share of vertically integrated firms. However, the major
reason for high share of vertical FDI here is the large amount of input goods,
that local affiliates draw from the German parent companies. This can be
clearly seen from definition of typeIII: share of vertical FDI in CIS countries
is in particular low if one uses the market oriented definition of FDI.
24See Markusen et al. (1996) and Chapter 2 for a detailed discussion of conditions for
each type of FDI.
25See Chapter 3.3 for empirical evidence.
26This group of countries received almost 70 percent of German FDI in CEE, see
Deutsche Bundesbank (2001).
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Table 4.3: Shares of Vertical and Horizontal on Total FDI in CEE, in Percent
Definitions: type I type II type III
horiz. vert. horiz. vert. horiz. vert.
Central Europe
Czech Rep. 64 36 44 45 64 35
Hungary 70 30 53 39 70 28
Poland 73 27 52 43 76 23
Slovakia 68 32 52 35 65 34
Slovenia 55 45 50 50 65 35
South Eastern Europe
Bulgaria 46 54 58 33 71 29
Croatia 63 37 75 21 83 17
Romania 48 52 50 46 58 42
Other* 0 100 56 44 78 22
Baltic states
Estonia 55 45 64 36 82 18
Latvia 65 35 71 29 76 24
Lithuania 54 46 63 33 83 17
CIS
Russia 47 53 53 43 82 18
Ukraine 58 42 63 38 83 17
Other** 46 54 54 46 74 26
Total 63 37 51 41 71 27
Source: Sample of 1,050 German FDI projects in CEE.
Note: Shares do not add to 100 percent due to missing values. “Other” includes weighted
average of countries of the relevant region with low number of observations. * Albania,
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Yugoslavia, ** Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Geor-
gia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan.
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In sum, the results on geographical distribution widely confirm the pre-
dictions from the theoretical literature: Vertical FDI can be observed in
countries with cheap labour force and low transportation costs to Germany.
4.3.3 Estimation
The empirical estimation follows the method proposed by Brainard and Riker
(1997b). The estimation equation is based on the equation (4.5) and uses
variables from the model in log-linear form.27 Following previous literature on
FDI employment effects we employ ordinary least squares (OLS) to estimate
the labour demand function:
lnLi = α+ β1 lnwi + β2 lnQi + β3 lnwj + β4 lnQj + µ+ δk + i (4.9)
Labour demand Li in country i depends on local wages wi and local out-
put Qi but also on wages wj and output Qj in the other country j, with
i 6= j, and i, j ∈ h, f . This way we capture simultaneously the direct effect
of local production on employment and the interaction with foreign affiliate.
The latter is our main focus and is a two-directional relationship between
parent and affiliate. The labour demand of the parent firm and of the affil-
iate company are estimated separately, which gives a better insight into the
relationship of wages and labour demand between both companies and is an
improvement compared to the prior studies. Thus, we estimate the equation
(4.9) four times: labour demand for parent and affiliate, and for vertical and
horizontal FDI separately.
The dependent variable Li is measured by the number of employees in
each affiliate, while for the parent firm it is the number of employees in Ger-
many. Since the firms reported the total wage bill in each location, wages are
calculated as total expenditures on labour per capita, which includes gross
27This is a simplifying assumption since not all of the labour demand equation are
log-linear in explanatory variables. However, it is a standard approach in the empirical
literature on marginal wage effects.
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salary and all additional expenses. Output Qi is measured as sales of the af-
filiate or the parent firm in Germany. Sales are used as an approximation for
the output of the firms, since it includes sales of final goods to external cus-
tomers, exports and sales of intermediate goods to parent or foreign affiliate.
In a similar way Blomstro¨m et al. (1997) used parent and affiliate net sales as
a proxy for output in order to estimate the effects of FDI on labour demand
in US and Sweden. Carr et al. (2001) also take sales volume to indicate the
production activity while estimating the knowledge capital model. In con-
trast, Brainard and Riker (1997b) and Braconier and Ekholm (2000) conduct
the estimation of labour effects using the demand for the final good, which
is proxied by aggregated demand in this sector or GDP per capita. However,
this indirect method leads to a lower explanatory power of estimation results.
In addition to output and wages, which are derived directly from the
model, the estimation equation includes some further explanatory variables.
The fixed effects are captured by country group coefficient δk with k ∈ [1; 3].
The countries with affiliates of German firms are grouped in four geograph-
ical regions: Central European accession countries, Baltic states, Southern
European countries and CIS, in accordance to the Table 4.3. The first and
largest country group is not included in δk coefficient but is captured by the
constant α, thus showing the difference between the left three regions and
the main recipient region.
Previous studies predict different employment effects for manufacturing
and service providers, since service activities are more difficult to relocate
than the industrial manufacturing. We control for this effect using a dummy
variable µ for industry of the parent firm.28 A company is defined as man-
ufacturer (µ = 1), if it fits the SITC classification registry, and is service
provider else (µ = 0).
In contrast to Konnings and Murphy (2001) estimation equation (4.9)
28In the most cases parent and affiliate have the same type, since it was one of the
criteria for the firm selection. See introduction for more details.
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does not contain interest rates. The data set on German FDI shows, that
in most cases the financing of FDI comes mostly from the reallocation of
financial resources within the firm.29 External financing was observed only
in few cases, and most of them were conducted through German banks.
Since most surveyed firms are big investors they also face similar interest
rates. Therefore all investors have similar costs of financing, which can not
explain differences in labour demand.
Table 4.4: Expected Signs of the Labour Demand Function
Dependent Variable: Affiliate employment Parent employment
horizontal vertical horizontal vertical
Affiliate sales + + 0 +
Affiliate wages - - 0 -
Parent sales 0 + + +
Parent wages 0 - - -
Based on the results from the theoretical model Table 4.4 reports the
expected signs for the coefficients in equation (4.9). Coefficients showing
complementarity or substitutional relationship between parent and affiliate
employment are set in bold face. The first obvious prediction is that higher
local output has always positive and higher local wages always negative im-
pact on labour demand. On the other side, the cross border effect of output
and wages on labour demand in the foreign affiliate depends on the type of
investment. In case of horizontal FDI variation of sales or wages in one coun-
try has no marginal effects on employment in other country. Nevertheless,
for low transportation costs the final good can be shifted back due to some
substitution effects. In such case the sign would turn negative if the absolute
effect dominates. In case of vertical FDI labour demand is complementary
29See Marin et al. (2002).
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in both locations: higher output in one country means higher demand for
input goods from the other country and therefore a higher labour demand
abroad. Similarly, higher wages make the product more expensive, sales go
down and labour demand decreases.
4.4 Results
4.4.1 Estimation Results
The estimation results are reported separately for the three definitions of
horizontal and vertical FDI in Tables 4.5, 4.6 and 4.7. Each table includes
estimations of the equation (4.9) with employment in foreign affiliate and
in parent company as depending variable. In addition, the estimations are
conducted with separate subsamples of horizontal and vertical FDI. Coeffi-
cients showing complementarity or substitution effects of labour demand are
highlighted in bold face.
The main finding on marginal employment effect is that the complemen-
tarity characteristic of vertical FDI can be supported by empirical data for
the first time. On the other hand, the horizontal FDI has, as predicted, no
effect or only small substitutional effect on employment in other country.
Table 4.5 presents estimation results for vertical and horizontal FDI ac-
cording to the definition of type I. In the first two columns the dependent
variable is labour demand of the foreign affiliate. In the case of horizontal
FDI there is no significant relationship between parent sales or parent wages
and the affiliate employment, thus fully supporting the prediction from the
theoretical model. Both coefficients are small and not significant. In the
case of vertical FDI parent sales have a positive impact on employment in
the foreign affiliate. This is again a clear confirmation of the theoretical
model. Higher sales by the parent company lead to stronger demand for
intermediate goods from the affiliate in CEE and thus to higher labour de-
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mand abroad. If parent sales increase by 10 percent labour demand in CEE
increases by 0,85 percent. On the other hand, the cross border wage elas-
ticity is negative as predicted, but not significant. The negative sign attests
the complementarity character of vertical FDI. Generally it can be observed,
that labour demand in case of vertical FDI is more sensitive to wage changes
than with horizontal investments.
The manufacturing-dummy is in all cases positive and significant. This
points to larger affiliates of manufacturing companies in CEE and therefore
to a higher labour demand compared to service providers. The industry
dummy for vertical FDI is always larger, which also can be interpreted as
larger foreign affiliates of vertical multinationals. This is a plausible result,
since export oriented outsourcing FDI serves a larger foreign market.30 The
dummies for country groups have a negative sign for horizontal and a positive
sign for vertical FDI and are not significant.
The last two columns of Table 4.5 display the estimation results with
parent employment as dependent variable. Parent sales and parent wages
have the expected sign and are strongly significant. The coefficient “affiliate
sales” is negative and significant, so horizontally segmented firms are charac-
terised by a negative relationship between sales abroad and employment in
the home country. This contradicts the theoretical model of marginal effects
and points to a substitutional relationship: higher sales abroad lead to in-
creasing employment in the affiliate and falling labour demand in the home
country. This points to a reallocation from parent to affiliate if the foreign
market becomes larger. At the same time affiliate wages have no significant
impact on the parent employment as predicted by the model. For vertical
FDI the results are not as clear as for the estimation with affiliate employ-
ment as dependent variable. As predicted, higher wages abroad lead to lower
employment at home, so the cross wage elasticity is negative.
30Chapter 5.2 will present empirical evidence for this argument.
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Table 4.5: Estimation of Labour Demand: Type I
Dependent Variable: Affiliate employment Parent employment
horizontal vertical horizontal vertical
Affiliate sales 0.694*** 0.596*** -0.127*** -0.098**
(0.039) (0.059) (0.031) (0.044)
Affiliate wages -0.677*** -0.867* 0.037 -0.219*
(0.068) (0.083) (0.053) (0.063)
Parent sales 0.017 0.085** 1.028*** 1.067***
(0.031) (0.047) (0.024) (0.036)
Parent wages 0.079 -0.204 -0.639*** -1.683*
(0.123) (0.263) (0.096) (0.198)
Manufacturing 0.408*** 0.739*** 0.401*** 0.593***
(0.131) (0.195) (0.102) (0.146)
Baltic States -0.104 -0.269 0.181 -0.200
(0.339) (0.339) (0.265) (0.255)
Southern E. Europe -0.206 -0.098 -0.257 -0.228
(0.260) (0.223) (0.202) (0.168)
Former SU 0.241 -0.997*** 0.164 0.014
(0.180) (0.211) (0.140) (0.159)
Constant -1.638 3.257 -4.663*** 8.214***
(1.303) (2.639) (1.017) (1.987)
R2 0.751 0.691 0.915 0.905
Adjusted R2 0.742 0.673 0.912 0.899
Number of observations 225 147 225 147
Source: Sample of 1,050 German FDI projects in CEE.
Note: *** significant at 1 percent level, ** significant at 5 percent level, * significant at
10 percent level, standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients showing the cross border
employment effects are set in bold face.
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On the other hand, higher sales in the foreign affiliate have a negative
impact on employment in Germany. From the theoretical model one would
expect the positive sign for this coefficient. One possible explanation is that,
again, absolute effects of reallocation dominate over the marginal effects: If
the foreign affiliate produces more, this occurs through reallocation of ad-
ditional production from the parent company. Thus, the negative impact
of increasing affiliate sales on parent employment for both, horizontal and
vertical FDI are signs for the relocation trend to CEE. Interestingly, the neg-
ative effect cannot be observed from the other direction: The comparable
coefficients in the first two columns (“Parent sales”) are positive. So the
negative effect can be observed only in one direction. Such asymmetry for
sales variable could be a result of large differences in size between the parent
MNE and a much smaller foreign affiliate. In contrast, the coefficients of
cross border wage elasticity are similar for both direction but are not signif-
icant for the foreign affiliate employment.
Table 4.6 presents the results of the same estimation equation, but for
the different definition of horizontal and vertical FDI (typeII). For the rele-
vant coefficients of cross border labour demand the results are similar to the
previously described definition of typeI. For the affiliate employment they
fully support the theoretical predictions. Within the same country own sales
have positive and own wages a negative impact on labour demand. The cross
country effects have all the right sign and are significant except for parent
wages. In case of parent employment the affiliate wages have a negative sign
but are not significant, which is good for the horizontal model and bad for
the vertical. Again, the affiliate sales have a negative sign and are strongly
significant. This reinforces the arguments used to explain the results for the
definition of typeI. The coefficient for manufacturing stays positive and sig-
nificant. The country groups coefficients in the second column turn positive,
even though not significant.
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Table 4.6: Estimation of Labour Demand: Type II
Dependent Variable: Affiliate employment Parent employment
horizontal vertical horizontal vertical
Affiliate sales 0.729*** 0.651*** -0.088** -0.098***
(0.043) (0.047) (0.038) (0.035)
Affiliate wages -0.667*** -0.746*** -0.072 -0.024
(0.084) (0.071) (0.074) (0.053)
Parent sales -0.016 0.130*** 0.987*** 1.056***
(0.035) (0.035) (0.031) (0.026)
Parent wages 0.189 -0.122 -0.801*** -0.818***
(0.163) (0.166) (0.142) (0.125)
Manufacturing 0.285** 0.368** 0.346** 0.404***
(0.152) (0.144) (0.132) (0.109)
Baltic States -0.268 0.281 0.160 -0.066
(0.152) (0.311) (0.327) (0.234)
Southern E. Europe -0.082 0.091 -0.096 -0.107
(0.241) (0.235) (0.210) (-0.177)
Former SU -0.449** 0.163 0.190 0.116
(0.202) (0.194) (0.176) (0.146)
Constant -3.071** -0.031 -1.699 -2.966
(1.716) (1.667) (1.498) (1.255)
R2 0.757 0.721 0.886 0.919
Adjusted R2 0.745 0.709 0.880 0.916
Number of observations 174 184 174 184
Source: Sample of 1,050 German FDI projects in CEE.
Note: *** significant at 1 percent level, ** significant at 5 percent level, * significant at
10 percent level, standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients showing the cross border
employment effects are set in bold face.
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The results are also similar for the last definition (typeIII), as shown in
Table 4.7. For affiliate employment there are no deviation in signs from the
previous definitions presented in Tables 4.5 and 4.6. In case of parent em-
ployment the coefficient for the cross wage elasticity has a positive sign but
stays not significant. Thus, the predictions from the model about marginal
cross border effects are empirically supported even using different separation
techniques between vertical and horizontal FDI.
Finally we turn to some robustness checks. The general fit of the estima-
tion equation measured by adjusted R2 is high for all estimations. To prove
the stability of results the estimations have been run only with variables from
the theoretical model shown in Table 4.4. In this specification the size of the
coefficients deviated slightly, while the signs for all relevant variables remain
the same. In the second step the estimations have been conducted without
the coefficient for parent employment in order to see, whether other effects
are also dominated by this coefficient (heterogeneity). Even then, relevant
coefficients from the model still keep the same sign. The single change ap-
peared for the coefficient of affiliate employment. However, this is what one
would expect, since sales of parent and affiliate are correlated. If parent sales
are excluded, affiliate sales provide the best proxy for parent sales. In the last
step, firms have been ranked by total sales of parent company in Germany in
order to control for the firm size. Then all estimations were extended by the
coefficient “ranking”. However, incorporation of the size effect did not have
any significant effect. Thus, firm size effects were caught by the constant and
the sales coefficient.
Overall, the complementarity result for vertical FDI is empirically sup-
ported. Horizontal FDI is shown to have no or at least an one-directional
substitution effect on labour demand in Germany. The negative impact of af-
filiate sales on parent employment points to reallocation effects toward CEE
and holds for all three definitions and for both types of FDI.
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Table 4.7: Estimation of Labour Demand: Type III
Dependent Variable: Affiliate employment Parent employment
horizontal vertical horizontal vertical
Affiliate sales 0.693*** 0.733*** -0.100*** -0.009
(0.038) (0.058) (0.030) (0.045)
Affiliate wages -0.753*** -0.678*** -0.087 0.004
(0.068) (0.089) (0.055) (0.070)
Parent sales 0.033 0.093* 0.997*** 1.022***
(0.030) (0.052) (0.024) (0.041)
Parent wages 0.156 -0.133 -0.796*** -0.757***
(0.137) (0.198) (0.110) (0.155)
Manufacturing 0.283** 0.219 0.341*** 0.604***
(0.124) (0.215) (0.100) (0.169)
Baltic States -0.372 0.546 0.071 -0.034
(0.329) (0.340) (0.265) (0.267)
Southern E. Europe -0.155 0.161 -0.155 0.043
(-0.221) (0.240) (0.178) (0.188)
Former SU -0.168 -0.232 0.188 0.055
(0.166) (-0.300) (0.134) (0.235)
Constant -2.171 -0.929 -1.566 -4.938***
(1.435) (1.946) (1.158) (1.527)
R2 0.725 0.777 0.891 0.925
Adjusted R2 0.716 0.758 0.888 0.919
Number of observations 262 103 262 103
Source: Sample of 1,050 German FDI projects in CEE.
Note: *** significant at 1 percent level, ** significant at 5 percent level, * significant at
10 percent level, standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients showing the cross border
employment effects are set in bold face.
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4.4.2 Comparison with Previous Empirical Studies
Table 4.8 compares the estimation results with previous studies on labour
effects of FDI. The direct comparison is possible because this chapter, like
most studies in this field, employs the estimation procedure introduced by
Brainard and Riker (1997a). On the other side, the differences to previous
studies are the distinguishing between vertical and horizotal FDI and the
employment of the cross section data set, while all other use panel data. We
compare our results on German FDI in CEE with estimations for high-wage
home country (US or Sweden) and different low-wage host countries. The
comparison will be carried out for vertical FDI of the typeI definition.
As expected, in our study local wages have always negative and local out-
put always positive impact on employment in the same location. This result
is fully supported by previous studies: The effects of local sales and wages
on labour demand in the same location are similar to Brainard and Riker
(1997b) and Koning and Murphy (2001), while the coefficients in Braconier
and Ekholm (2000) are smaller. Therefore in the following we focus on the
cross border effects that are presented in the Table 4.8.
The results in this chapter show the complementarity of labour demand
for vertical FDI: Higher wages in one location lead to lower labour demand in
other location. Higher output of the parent company has a positive impact
on labour demand in the affiliate company. These results are supported by
previous studies. For example Brainard and Riker (1997b) find similar cross
border wage elasticities for parent and affiliate labour demand in sign and
amount. Using the data for US multinationals they show a complementary
relationship between wages in low-wage location and the parent employment.
The positive effect of parent sales on affiliate employment was also found by
Braconier and Ekholm (2000) for Swedish multinationals.
However, one difference occurs with respect to wage effects in comparison
to Braconier and Ekholm (2000) and Konnings and Murphy (2001). In both
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Table 4.8: Comparison with Previous Studies
Dependent Variable: Affiliate employment* Parent employment**
Explanatory Variables: parent affiliate
wages sales wages sales
Brainard/Riker (1997a) -0.225 - -0.185 -
(0.080) - (0.049) -
Braconier/Ekholm (2000) -0.64 0.28 0.06 0.35
(0.85) (0.23) (0.11) (0.09)
Konings/Murphy (2001) - - 0.015 -
- - (0.022) -
This Study*** -0.204 0.085 -0.219 -0.098
(0.263) (0.047) (0.063) (0.044)
Note: * Foreign affiliate in CEE or in low-wage countries, ** parent company or affiliate in
high-wage countries, *** vertical FDI, definition typeI, standard errors in the parentheses.
studies affiliate wages have a positive effect on parent employment, however,
it is small and not significant. In Konnings and Murphy (2001) the wage
elasticity coefficient turns negative for manufacturing sector, but it is again
small and not significant. The main difference to Braconier and Ekholm
(2000) is that affiliate sales have a negative impact on parent employment.
This result can be an indication for some reallocation effects and is not
supported by positive marginal effects. Finally, the reason for different size
of wage effects, and in some cases different signs of the sales effect could
be explained by different composition of FDI flows used for the estimation.
While previous studies conduct the estimation for FDI as a whole, i.e. vertical
and horizontal together, this study estimates each of them separately.
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4.5 Conclusions and Implications
The impact of foreign direct investments on employment in the home and
host countries of multinationals is one of the major questions for empirical
research on multinational enterprise. However, previous studies on this topic
do not distinguish between different types of investment. As this chapter has
shown, vertical and horizontal FDI have different motivations and thus, dif-
ferent impacts on employment. To demonstrate this, the chapter developed
a theoretical model of cross border employment effects for each type of FDI
and tested the predictions with the empirical data. Overall, the differenti-
ation between vertical and horizontal FDI gives a better understanding of
employment effects of FDI.
In the first part, a theoretical model presents the theoretical basis for the
analysis of cross border employment effects. Following previous literature,
it focuses on marginal effects of existing affiliates and differentiates between
vertical and horizontal FDI. The model predicts, that in case of horizon-
tal FDI there are no marginal effects between different locations of MNE.
Thus, changes in wages or output in one location have no impact on the
labour demand in foreign affiliate. At the same time, vertical separation of
production leads to complementarity of labour demand in different locations.
The empirical part is based on the data set of German FDI in Central
and Eastern Europe and consists of two stages. Firstly, based on intra-firm
trade and geography of sales we create three measurements for distinguishing
between vertical and horizontal FDI. For the first time the chapter describes
empirically the differences between both types of FDI like motivation and
the composition of FDI flows to a single country in CEE. As predicted, both
types of FDI have clearly different motivations: Vertical FDI is more cost
oriented, while horizontal FDI more host market oriented. Overall, empirical
data points to a high share of vertical FDI in CEE, which ranges between 27
and 41 percent depending on definition.
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Secondly, theoretical predictions have been widely supported by empirical
estimation of labour demand function of multinational enterprise. The esti-
mated coefficients indicate a significant complementarity of labour demand
between affiliates in case of vertical division of production. In the case of
horizontal FDI the cross border labour effects are much smaller and not sig-
nificant in most cases. Nevertheless, some reallocation effects from German
labour market can be observed for both, horizontal and vertical investments.
The results of this chapter have also political implications, as they give
a sense for transmission effects of shocks from CEE to Germany. Earlier
studies argue, that higher wages in CEE mean lower competition for the
German labour market, which is truth for the initial reallocation decision.
But growing wages in CEE do not only mean the smaller danger of realloca-
tion. As the chapter shows for already existing affiliates, a wage increase in
CEE makes inputs for German firms more expensive and brings additional
pressure on the German labour market, since the share of vertical FDI among
German investments to CEE is very high. Thus, high share of vertical FDI
means close relationship between production volume and labour demand in
both regions. For example, growing wages in CEE due to EU accession or
due to the growing bargaining power of trade unions can lead to job losses
in Germany.
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4.6 Appendix
1. Cost Function
The cost function of the multinational enterprise is derived in two steps. In
the first stage, the cost functions for the intermediate goods A and B are
calculated. In the second stage they are added due to the fixed proportion
feature of the Leontieff production function and summed up for all locations.
i.) Cost Function for Intermediate Good
Due to the same production function for both intermediate goods the cost
function is symmetric for both input goods. Here we derive it for the in-
termediate good A in country i, while the function for the input good B is
identical. We minimise the cost function for the input good A
ci = (1 + tij)wiLi + rKi → min! (4.10)
under the constraint of the Cobb-Douglas production function
Ai = L
α
A,iK
β
A,i (4.11)
with constant returns to scale α+β = 1. The Lagrangean for the problem is
L = (1 + tij)wiLi + rKi + λ
[
A− LαA,iKβi
]
(4.12)
The first order conditions for the minimum of L are
∂L
∂LA,i
= (1 + tij)wi − λαLα−1A,i Kβi = 0 (4.13)
∂L
∂Ki
= r − λβLαA,iKβ−1i = 0 (4.14)
∂L
∂λ
= A− LαA,iKβi = 0 (4.15)
Division of (4.13) by (4.14) gives
Ki =
β
α
(1 + t)wA,i
r
LA,i (4.16)
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Inserting the equation (4.16) in (4.15) and using the property of constant
returns to scale gives the factor consumption functions for labour LA,i and
capital Ki:
LA,i =
(
α
β
r
(1 + t)wA,i
)β
Ai (4.17)
Ki =
(
α
β
r
(1 + t)wA,i
)β−1
Ai (4.18)
Inserting the factor consumption equations into the cost function from
the equation (4.10) produces the cost function for the intermediate good A
in the country i
C(Ai) = Ai ((1 + tij)wA,i)
α
((
α
β
)β
+
(
α
β
)−α)
(4.19)
Since the intermediate good B is produced with the same production
function as A it has the same cost function:
C(Bi) = Bi ((1 + tij)wB,i)
α
((
α
β
)β
+
(
α
β
)−α)
(4.20)
ii.) Cost Function for final goods in two countries
Adding up the cost functions for intermediate goods A and B in both coun-
tries h and f gives the cost function of the MNE:
C =
∑
i [Ci(Ai) + Ci(Bi)] =
=
∑
i
[
rβγ (Ai ((1 + tij)wA,i)
α +Bi ((1 + tij)wB,i)
α)
] (4.21)
where γ =
(
α
β
)β
+
(
α
β
)−β
and i ∈ h, f
Q.E.D.
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2. Labour Demand Function
The total labour demand of an affiliate is the sum of labour needed to produce
input goods A and B. The labour demand for the intermediate good is the
same for both goods A and B and is derived from the production function
using a standard Lagrange optimisation approach:
L = wLA,i + rKA + λ
[
Ai − LαA,iKβA
]
(4.22)
The procedure is the same as for the equation (4.17), however without
transportation costs, since the input goods are used in the same country. So
the labour demand function equals to
LA,i =
(
α
β
r
w
) β
α+β
A
1
α+β
i (4.23)
The labour demand function for the input good B is derived in the same
way. Finally, adding the labour demands required for the production of each
input good and substituting Q for A (since one unit of input good is required
to produce one unit of final good) gives the total labour demand function:
Li =
(
α
β
) β
α+β
Q
1
α+β
i
((
r
wAi
) β
α+β
+
(
r
wBi
) β
α+β
)
(4.24)
Q.E.D.
3. Relationship Between Labour Demand in country h and
Wages in country f
From the fixed proportion property of the Leontief production function we
know that for the production of one unit of final good Qh the MNE needs
one unit of intermediate good B. In case of vertical division of production
the intermediate good B is imported from country f . Substituting Bf for
Qh in equation (4.7) we get
Lh =
(
α
β
) β
α+β
B
1
α+β
f
(
r
wAh
) β
α+β
(4.25)
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Now we can show that Bf depends on local wages wf by rewriting the
equation 4.17 for intermediate good B:
Bf =
(
β
α
tf,hw
B
f
r
)−β
Lf (4.26)
Inserting Bf from (4.26) into (4.25) gives the labour demand function
depending on foreign wages:
Lh =
(
α
β
) β
α+β
((
β
α
tf,hw
B
f
r
)−β
Lf
) 1
α+β (
r
wAh
) β
α+β
=
=
(
α
β
) 2β
α+β
(
r2
tf,hw
B
f w
A
h
) β
α+β
L
1
α+β
f
(4.27)
Differentiation with respect to wages wf and transportation costs tfh gives
∂Lh
∂wBf
= − β
α+ β
(
α
β
) 2β
α+β
(
1
wBf
) β−1
α+β (
r2
tf,hwAh
) β
α+β
L
1
α+β
f < 0 (4.28)
∂Lh
∂tfh
= − β
α+ β
(
α
β
) 2β
α+β
(
1
tfh
) β−1
α+β
(
r2
wBf w
A
h
) β
α+β
L
1
α+β
f < 0 (4.29)
Q.E.D.
Thus, in case of vertical division of production labour demand in country
h depends negatively on wages in country f and on transportation costs
between these two countries.
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Chapter 5
The Good, the Bad or the
Irrelevant: Vertical and
Horizontal FDI in the Czech
Republic
5.1 Introduction
Governments of many countries try to attract foreign direct investments
through regulatory and tax incentives. In particular in Eastern European
transition countries foreign direct investment play a crucial role in the catching-
up process, since they bring capital, technology and managerial know-how.
However, when promoting foreign investments governments often favour those
investments which are oriented towards the local market and locate the com-
plete production chain in the host country. An example is the assembly plant
for car engines of Audi AG in Hungary, which attracted many complaints
from local politicians, because most intermediate goods were imported, only
the labour intensive assembly took place in Hungary and final products were
exported to foreign markets. So the question is, whether such discrimination
between different types of investments is legitimate. Is market seeking FDI
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good and cost seeking FDI bad for the host economy? This chapter will try
to answer this question, focusing on different types of German direct invest-
ments in the Czech Republic.
The Czech Republic is one of the largest recipients of Foreign Direct In-
vestment (FDI) in Central and Eastern Europe. Measured by amount of
foreign investments per capita it is the leader since 1998.1 Foreign owned
enterprises play a significant role in the Czech economy as a large employer
and capital stock builder (Zemplinerova and Rajdoval, 2002). Since the be-
ginning of the transition process, Foreign Direct Investments contributed
substantially to the strong economic recovery in the Czech Republic, bring-
ing capital, up-to-date technology and management skills. The largest part
of the contribution are the transfers of capital and technology to the own
affiliates of multinational enterprises.2 But besides these direct transfers to
foreign owned affiliates the host country benefits from FDI inflows in many
other ways. Technology dispersion to the local firms has been seen as one
of the most important ways. In addition, foreign investments contribute to
the employment in the host country, its integration in the global production
network and the amount of local R&D activities. Finally, they also affect the
local competition and tax income.
The theoretical literature on multinational enterprises distinguishes be-
tween two types of investments: vertical FDI, when the multinational sep-
arates the production process between countries (Helpman and Krugman,
1985), and horizontal FDI, when the multinational duplicates the same pro-
duction in different locations (Markusen, 1995). However, this differentiation
was not used in the literature on host country effects of FDI. One reason was
the absolute dominance of horizontal FDI in the world investment flows. In
addition, the theoretical and empirical basis for vertical FDI was created
1See Table 1.2 in the Chapter 1.
2See Marin et. al. (2002), Djankov and Hoeckman (2000).
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only recently. However, recent empirical studies show the increasing impor-
tance of vertical FDI (Blomstro¨m et al., 2001) and even introduce other new
types of FDI like export platform or distribution FDI (Hanson et al., 2001).
In Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), vertical FDI seems to play a larger
role than in industrialised countries.3 Thus, the next step is to distinguish
between these types of investment in order to analyse the effects of FDI on
the host economy. Furthermore, the previous literature on spillover effects
of FDI delivered very controversial results. This chapter argues, that dif-
ferent types of investment have a different impact on the host economy and
therefore the distinction between vertical and horizontal FDI can explain the
contradictory findings of previous literature.
There is an extensive literature on the host and home country effects of
FDI, with most empirical studies focusing on technology spillover effects as
the major contribution to the host economy.4 However, the results of this
literature are rather mixed. On the one hand, a number of case studies
as well as some empirical studies point to significant positive spillovers.5
On the other hand, several empirical studies found negative spillover effects
on domestic firms without foreign participation (Djankov and Hoeckman,
2000, Aitken et al., 1997, and Harrison 1996). Most studies for transition
countries show negative effects, while they are positive for developed and
developing countries, even if the total effect of FDI on the host economy is
overwhelmingly described to be positive.6
Several recent studies explore the spillover effects in transition countries.
The first group employs firm level data to investigate the intra-industry
spillovers when technology is transferred within the same industry. Here,
3See Marin et al. (2002) and Chapter 4 of the thesis for the share of vertical FDI in
CEE.
4See Lipsey (2002) and Blomstro¨m and Kokko (2003) for an overview.
5See Go¨rg and Greenway (2001)for an overview.
6For an overview see Go¨rg and Greenway (2001). Moran (1998) and UNCTAD (1999)
discuss the positive effects of FDI in general on the host country.
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Djankov and Hoeckman (2000) reported negative and Kinoshita (2001) not
significant spillover effects on the productivity of domestic firms in the Czech
republic. Konings (2001) and Damijan et al. (2001) confirmed this nega-
tive effect for the most CEE countries. The second group focuses on the
inter-industry spillovers, occurring from foreign affiliates to local suppliers
in other industries. Using firm level data for Lithuania, Smarzynska (2002)
found positive inter-industry (vertical) spillover effects but no significance
for intra-industry (horizontal) spillovers. The negative results could reflect
the fact that in transition economies local firms takes more time to adapt
and learn to apply a new technology, since the most mentioned studies cover
periods of up to 4 years.
As mentioned above, the literature on technology spillovers distinguishes
between two types of spillover channels. Horizontal spillovers take place in
the same industry. Vertical spillovers occurs from the foreign affiliate to the
local input goods supplier. The scale of the vertical channel depends there-
fore on the question, how much input goods foreign affiliate obtains from
domestic firms and how much from the parent company. At the same time
the definition of vertical FDI is based on the criterion, whether the input
good comes from the parent company. Thus, it is necessary to differenti-
ate between two types of vertical FDI: forward and backward vertical FDI.
Forward vertical FDI takes place if the foreign affiliate receives input goods
from the parent for further production. Backward vertical FDI describes the
investment, when the affiliate sends its final goods back to the parent for the
further production or sales. The differentiation between forward and back-
ward FDI is empirically not always clear cut, since some investments belong
to both categories simultaneously, if the affiliate receives input goods from
the parent company and sends its production back. This is the so called
“outsourcing FDI”. Even if its share is not very large and consists of the de-
scribed two types of vertical FDI, a part of the analysis will be dedicated to
this type, since this type of FDI feeds the fears of local governments in host
countries about encapsulated plants without linkages to the local economy.
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Besides the spillover effects, other studies of the impact of FDI on the host
country concern financial and export performance, integration into global
markets and industrial restructuring.7 But again, they do not distinguish
between different types of FDI. Therefore, the contribution of this chapter
consists of three points: First, the next section delivers empirical evidence
for different types of FDI in the Czech Republic. Second, section 3 estimates
spillover effects of vertical and horizontal FDI on domestic firms. Finally
section 4 compares other impacts and characteristics of different FDI types
on the host country like employment and technology.
5.2 Vertical and Horizontal FDI in the Czech
Republic
5.2.1 Data
The chapter employs two data sources: data on German FDI from a firm
survey to identify different investment types and data on foreign and domestic
enterprises from the Czech Statistical Office to analyze host country effects.
The data set of German FDI in the Czech Republic is a part of the firm
survey conducted by the Chair for International Economics at the University
of Munich.8 The total number of surveyed investment projects in the Czech
Republic is 265 and the total investment volume is 12.5 billion DEM. Thus,
the empirical basis for the further analysis is equivalent to 51.1 percent of all
German FDI measured by number of affiliates and 24.8 percent measured by
number of employees on all German FDI in the Czech Republic in 1999.9
We distinguish between vertical and horizontal FDI using two types of
7Kaminsky and Riboud (2000), and Hunya (1998).
8A detailed description of the data set is given in the introduction of the thesis.
9Bundesbank (2003). The collected investment volume is with 128,5 percent even larger
than the sum of FDI inflows, since the survey employs a slightly wider definition of FDI.
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information: the intra-firm trade with input goods between German parent
and Czech affiliates and the geography of sales of affiliates. An investment
project is defined as vertical, if the Czech affiliate receives more than 50 per-
cent of its inputs from the German parent company (forward vertical FDI) or
if it sends more than 50 percent of production to Germany for further refine-
ment or sales (backward vertical FDI). All other cases are of the horizontal
type.10
The data set on domestic firms in manufacturing sector comes from the
Czech statistical office.11 It contains the information on sales, assets and
employment for the period from 1993 to 1999. The data set distinguishes
between firms with foreign participation (fully owned by foreign firms or joint
ventures) and domestic firms without foreign participation.
5.2.2 Composition of German FDI
The Czech Republic is one of the largest FDI recipients in Central Eastern
Europe. Gross FDI inflows into the Czech Republic reached 4.9 billion USD
in 2001 or 8.9 percent of GDP, the highest in the region, bringing the stock
to over USD 20 Bill., or 40 percent of GDP.12 Measured by investment per
capita, the Czech Republic achieved inflows of 477 USD in 1999 and has been
the largest recipient of FDI in Central and Eastern Europe since 1998 as
shown in Table 1.2 in the Introduction. Foreign owned enterprises employs
89.3 thousand people in the Czech Republic and are responsible for 24.8
percent of exports. So they play a very important role in the Czech economy.
German FDI accounted for 26 percent of FDI stocks in the Czech Re-
public in the 1999 (UNCTAD, 2002). Table 5.1 describes the composition of
German FDI using the data from the representative firm survey. Horizontal
FDI accounts for 39.7 percent and vertical for 60.3 percent of all investment
10See Chapter 4 for detailed discussion and further possible definitions .
11Czech Statistical Office (2001). I am grateful to Dr. Gabor Hunya for providing the
data in electronic form.
12IMF (2002).
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Table 5.1: Vertical and Horizontal FDI in the Czech Republic
VFDI HFDI
Backward Forward
Share on total FDI
by number projects, in percent 38.4 35.9 39.7
Average size
FDI Sum, mill. DEM 19.3 11.3 93.6 (17.7)
Number of employees 253 136 516 (202)
Other characteristics
Greenfield Investments, in percent 68.1 77.2 50.6
productivity*, in thousand DEM 118.4 236.4 145.9
Source: Survey of 265 German investment projects in the Czech Republic.
Note: numbers for the manufacturing sector only. * Measured as sales per employee.
projects.13 The last number consists of forward and backward FDI, however
it is lower than the sum of both numbers in the first and second column,
because 14 percent of investments were simultaneously classified as forward
and backward vertical FDI or so called “outsourcing” FDI. Measured by FDI
volume, the share of horizontal FDI is with 76.7 percent much larger, which
is a consequence of several very large investments in financial and automotive
sectors. Two important conclusions arise from these results: First, the share
of vertical FDI in the Czech Republic is relatively high by international com-
parison. Second, outsourcing FDI represents only a small share of German
FDI in the Czech Republic.
Finally, Figure 5.1 shows the development of the different FDI types over
time. The share of vertical FDI among new projects has been continuously
falling since 1989, which is clear support of the Idea of the “FDI Life Cy-
cle” in transition countries presented in Chapter 3. An evolving trend is the
13Here and in all following computations shares are valid values.
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Figure 5.1: Time Pattern of Different FDI Types in the Czech Republic, in
Percent of New Investment Projects
slightly growing share of outsourcing FDI, which are investments in produc-
tion with the Czech affiliate receiving input goods from the parent company
and sending final goods back for further production. This positive trend is
an indication for a growing specialization (since not the full production chain
is conducted locally) and an increasing integration of the Czech economy in
the global production network.
5.2.3 Differences between Vertical and Horizontal FDI
In order to analyse the impacts of vertical and horizontal FDI on the Czech
economy it is necessary to explore the main differences between between
them that can influence the technology spillover. In this section we focus on
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the main characteristics like size, productivity and employed technology. As
Table 5.1 illustrates, horizontal FDI´s are on average larger size than verti-
cal FDI measured by investment and employment. However, this result is
driven by one very large investment, which distorts the average size of firms
in this group. Excluding this observation we get 17.6 million DEM average
FDI volume and 202 employees for horizontal FDI. In this case, backward
vertical investment projects are on average larger than forward vertical and
horizontal FDI in matter of investment, sales and employment. This result
supports the “export platform” theory, because backward vertical affiliates
serve a larger foreign market.14
Further differences between vertical and horizontal FDI exists with re-
spect to the mode of market entry. So, horizontal FDI takes place in almost
50 percent of all cases by acquiring local firms as shown in Table 5.1. One
possible explanation is that buying an existing firm gives the investor a quick
access to a large market share. In addition, a well established local brand
makes it easier to serve the new market. In contrast, 68.1 percent of export
oriented backward vertical FDI choose greenfield investment as the form of
market entry. These multinationals seem less interested in local brands, and
a modernisation of existing old production lines could be more expensive
than a completely new production site.15
In order to analyse spillover effects of different FDI types it is essential to
explore the differences between them with respect to productivity and tech-
nology. So the last line in the Table 5.1 reports the labour productivity for
all three types of FDI. The productivity is measured as sales per employee in
thousands DEM for the investment projects in manufacturing industries. It
varies from 118.4 thousand for export oriented vertical, over 145.9 thousand
14See Hanson et al. (2001) and Ekholm et al. (2003).
15For technology, competition and other reasons which motivate the entry modes see
Mueller (2002)
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for horizontal to 236.4 thousand for market oriented forward vertical FDI.
The low productivity of backward vertical FDI could mean that the coun-
try is specialised on labour intensive goods for exports. Or in other words
that export oriented MNEs are investing in labour intensive production, ex-
ploiting comparative advantage of the host country in cheap labour force.
This result supports the theories of vertical separation of production, with
German firms shifting labour intensive stages in the Czech Republic, which
has a much lower unit labour costs. The highest productivity is achieved by
forward vertical FDI, since this type of affiliates receives know-how through
input goods and have a stronger distributional character. On average, domes-
tic firms without foreign participation have a productivity of 51.1 thousand
DEM per worker. Thus, German affiliates are two (backward vertical) to four
times (forward vertical) more productive than the local firms in manufactur-
ing sector. German affiliates are even more productive than other Foreign
Owned Enterprises (FOE) in the Czech Republic, that achieve 102.6 thou-
sand DEM per employee.16 In sum, productivity differences between FDI
and local firms should represent a large potential for technology spillovers.
Next, we focus on technology used by different types of FDI. The ques-
tion here is whether export oriented investment only exploit the cheap labor
costs and do not conduct local R&D. The differences between vertical and
horizontal FDI with respect to technology employed and local expenditures
for R&D are displayed in Table 5.2. Measured by the stage of innovation,
vertical FDI transfers a higher technology than horizontal. Technological
advantage compared to local competitors is larger for the backward vertical
FDI, but is equal for both FDI forms oriented toward the Czech market.
The striking similarity between forward vertical and horizontal FDI could
have several reasons. During the interviews the investors claimed, that the
strongest competition occurs from the same international competitors as in
the home or in other foreign markets. Combined with the high share of FOE
16Czech Statistical Office (2001).
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Table 5.2: Technology Used by Vertical and Horizontal FDI, in Percent
VFDI HFDI
Backward Forward
Technology
Stage of Innovation, index* 2.26 2.22 2.45
Advantage to competitors 57.0 43.1 43.0
Local R & D
R&D expenditure to sales 1.3 0.7 0.8
R&D personal to total employment 11.5 9.4 9.6
Source: Survey of 265 German firms in Czech Republic.
Note: * The valuation for innovation is an index from 1 for “new, not yet established
technology” to 4 for “old technology”.
in the Czech Republic, this can explain the similarity between forward verti-
cal and horizontal FDI. In addition, vertical FDI employs a technology, which
it perceives to be more difficult to duplicate than in case of horizontal FDI.
The technological advantage of vertical FDI is backed by the extend of local
R&D efforts. Export oriented vertical FDI spends more on R&D activity,
measured by the share of R&D expenditures on sales and by the number of
scientific employees than investments oriented toward the local market.
Finally, firms were asked, whether their products are easy to duplicate,
since duplication is one of the major channels for technology spillovers. For-
ward vertical FDI, which receives more inputs from the parent firm than
other two types, claims to be the most difficult to duplicate. On the other
side, horizontal FDI produces products that are easiest to duplicate. These
results support again the idea of know-how transfer via trade in input goods,
proposed by Markusen et al. (1996).
In sum, the export oriented vertical FDI applies a better technology than
foreign investments oriented toward the Czech market.
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5.2.4 Industry Distribution
Now we turn to the distribution of different FDI types among sectors and
industries of the Czech economy in order to answer the question, whether
vertical and horizontal FDI follow different specialisation patterns. The the-
oretical literature predicts vertical FDI in more labour intensive sectors, while
horizontal FDI should occur in industries with high transportation costs.17
Thus, in a first step we investigate how different FDI types are distributed
among all sectors of the Czech economy. In a second step, we concentrate
on the manufacturing sector in order to get a more in depth comparison of
German FDI with local enterprises and with other foreign affiliates.
Table 5.3 shows clear patterns of specialisation for different FDI types
among sectors of the Czech economy, measured by volume of investment
and number of investment projects.18 More than 50 percent of all invest-
ments went to the manufacturing sector. The financial sector attracts also a
substantial part of foreign investment, while other sectors are rather weakly
represented. Measured by volume of investment, the manufacturing of me-
chanical products is even more important, attracting some very large in-
vestment projects, while the distribution pattern is still very similar. The
overwhelming part of horizontal FDI is going to the manufacturing sector
because of the outlier mentioned above. As expected, vertical FDI is also
strongly concentrated on manufacturing. However, there are some clear dif-
ferences between forward and backward vertical FDI. The former is strongly
represented in the trade and financial sector, while the latter is concentrated
in the metal manufacturing sector.
17Helpman and Krugman (1985), Brainard (1993b), Markusen (1995).
18Measurement by sales or by number of employees gives a similar distribution.
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Next, we focus on the distribution within the manufacturing sector, which
is the largest recipient of German FDI. The data set for the Czech Republic
allows for the comparison with local and other foreign owned enterprises
(FOE). Table 5.4 compares the distribution of all firms in manufacturing
sector with all FOE’s and different types of German affiliates from the survey.
Here we employ again the number of firms, since it is the most appropriate
way to compare different data sources.19
As the first three columns of Table 5.4 make clear, German FDI has a
different distribution path across the manufacturing sector than the local
firms and even other FOE. German investments are strongly represented in
know-how intensive sectors like machinery and equipment industry, motor
vehicles and publishing sector. To the contrary, German FDI is only weakly
represented in “commodity” industries like food and beverages, textiles and
wood. FOE follow a similar distribution path as all Czech firms.
The sectoral distribution of FDI gives a strong empirical support for sev-
eral theories of vertical and horizontal multinationals. Horizontal FDI is
strongly represented in publishing and food manufacturing sector, which are
characterised by high transportation costs and customer proximity. This
distribution supports the proximity-concentration approach introduced by
Brainard (1993b). On the other hand, vertical FDI is concentrated in labour
intensive sectors like fabricated metals, machinery, equipment and motor
vehicles. Thus, in accordance with Helpman and Krugman (1985) export
oriented vertical FDI exploits the comparative advantage of the Czech econ-
omy, since labour costs are lower then in the source countries of FDI.
In some industries the differences between vertical and horizontal FDI are
even larger, like in food manufacturing and in electrical machinery. At the
same time, other industries show similarities between horizontal and mar-
19But even here are some mismatches, like for instance in coke and petroleum industry
between German FDI and all other FOE. The reason could be differences in classification
of firms to ISIC codes.
127
Table 5.4: Distribution in Manufacturing Industry, in Percent
ISIC - Category
Firms VFDI HFDI
All FOE GER bckw. fwd.
15 - Food products, beverages 16.0 7.4 3.8 0.0 0.0 13.0
16 - Tobacco 0.1 0.4 0.6 0.0 0.0 2.2
17 - Textiles 5.6 6.0 3.2 5.6 4.1 2.2
18 - Wearing apparel, dressing 4.5 4.6 1.9 1.4 2.0 0.0
19 - Tanning, dressing of leather 1.8 1.5 0.6 1.4 0.0 0.0
20 - Wood 4.6 4.7 0.6 0.0 0.0 2.2
21 - Paper and paper products 1.5 2.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
22 - Publishing, printing 2.8 2.4 11.5 1.4 14.3 21.7
23 - Coke and petroleum 0.1 0.0 0.6 0.0 2.0 0.0
24 - Chemicals 2.2 2.8 2.6 2.8 2.0 2.2
25 - Rubber and plastic 3.9 7.0 10.9 12.5 6.1 13.0
26 - Other non-metallic minerals 6.4 8.5 5.8 5.6 0.0 10.9
27 - Basic metals 3.1 2.0 1.9 4.2 2.0 0.0
28 - Fabricated metals 14.5 12.4 9.0 12.5 10.2 4.3
29 - Machinery and equipment 12.7 10.1 17.3 15.3 14.3 13.0
30 - Office machinery 0.1 0.3 0.6 0.0 2.0 0.0
31 - Electrical machinery 5.5 9.1 7.7 5.6 8.2 2.2
32 - Radio, TV sets 1.5 2.6 0.6 1.4 2.0 0.0
33 - Medical, precision instr. 1.8 2.7 2.6 1.4 4.1 4.3
34 - Motor Vehicles, trailers 2.9 6.1 14.1 23.6 24.5 6.5
35 - Other transport equipment 1.5 0.6 0.6 1.4 2.0 2.2
36 - Manufacturing n.e.c. 6.4 5.5 3.2 4.2 0.0 0.0
37 - Recycling 0.4 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Total Manufacturing 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Czech Statistical Office (2001) and Survey of 265 German firms in Czech Republic.
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ket oriented forward vertical FDI, for example in publishing or in medical
and optical instruments. Here, forward vertical FDI shows similarities with
the horizontal FDI, since both serve the local market. The differences occur
mainly if the forward VFDI is exporting his production (backward vertical
FDI). This type of “outsourcing” FDI takes place mainly in textile, fabri-
cated metals and office machinery industries, where it achieves almost 50
percent of the surveyed investment projects. The total share of this type is
30 percent in the manufacturing industry, but only 14 percent on all German
FDI in Czech Republic.
To summarize the result of this section, vertical and horizontal FDI differ
significantly in motivation, size, technology and industry distribution. Thus,
the results make clear the importance of distinguishing between different
types of FDI when analysing host country effects of FDI.
5.3 Spillover Effects
5.3.1 Channels for Spillover Effects
There is an extensive theoretical and empirical literature which identifies
spillover effects of FDI as a whole on domestic firms in the host country.20
This literature suggests that knowledge spillovers can occur through different
channels like imitation, competition, labour mobility and export. However,
different types of FDI will exploit these channels in different ways. Thus,
as a starting point for the empirical analysis we will emphasize different im-
pacts of vertical and horizontal FDI by looking at the channels for technology
spillover. Table 5.5 presents the main channels for technology dispersion from
the foreign affiliates to the domestic firms: imitation, competition, labour
turnover and backward linkages.
20See Go¨rg and Greenway (2001) and Blomstro¨m and Kokko (2003) for a survey.
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Table 5.5: Impacts of Vertical and Horizontal FDI on Domestic Firms
through Different Spillover Channels
Vertical FDI
Horizontal FDI
Backward Forward
Imitation + +/- +/-
Competition 0 +/- +/-
Labour Turnover + + +
Export + 0 0
Local Inputs + 0 +
Imitation is a classical mechanism to develop new products or to acquire
technology from foreign firms.21 Clearly the scope of the spillover effect
depends on the complexity of the product and on how much the competitors
can see from the product. Therefore, products manufactured and sold locally
as it is the case for horizontal FDI, are supposed to be easier to imitate,
because complete production and sales take place in the same country. On
the other hand, vertical FDI can be easier imitated, if they conduct labour
intensive production with lower technology frontier.22
Many studies emphasize the important role of competition between for-
eign and domestic firms for the technology transfer.23 Even if the local com-
petitor is not in a position to imitate the technology of the foreign affiliate, it
is under pressure to use the existing technology more efficiently, which brings
productivity gains. This channel is in particular relevant for host country
oriented horizontal but also for forward vertical FDI. However, for several
reasons competition can also lead to negative results. First, as Djankov and
Hoeckman (2000) argue, multinationals tend to acquire the most productive
firms in the host country, decreasing the average productivity level of the
21See Wang and Blomstro¨m (1992) and Das (1987).
22See Girma et al. (2001) for empirical evidence.
23See for example Wang and Blomstro¨m (1992) and Glass and Saggi (2002).
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remaining firms in the industry. Second, foreign affiliates are expected to
guard their knowledge more closely and prevent any leakage to the domes-
tic competitors. Third, as Harrison (1996) pointed out, growing presence of
foreign firms has a negative effects on the economies of scale of local firms,
since their market share and volume of sales fall. Thus, market oriented FDI
can under such circumstances cause a negative effect on the productivity of
domestic firms.
Technology transfer can also occur through labour turnover. Workers that
move from MNE to local firms or start own firms carry with them knowledge
of new technology.24 This channel is common for all types of FDI and is seen
as one of the most important spillover channels.
Export spillovers are the next way for indirect knowledge transfer to lo-
cal firms. Here, domestic firms learn from multinationals how to export,
getting the information about new markets, regulatory arrangements, and
consumer preferences.25 This type of spillovers would occur from export ori-
ented vertical FDI, since multinationals conduct such FDI in order to serve
the foreign markets and bring the knowledge about destination markets to
the host country.
Finally, technology can be transferred to local firms through backward
linkages with local suppliers, as shown by Markusen and Venables (1999).
By obtaining input goods from local suppliers MNE transfer their standards
and knowledge to the local firms. This type of spillover is characteristic in
particular for horizontal FDI, and not for forward vertical FDI, which re-
ceives its inputs from the foreign parent company.
Thus, through different spillover channels vertical and horizontal FDI
have different impacts on the productivity of local firms. This variety of
channels and different effects of vertical and horizontal FDI can be the reason
24See for example Djankov and Hoeckman (2000).
25See Aitken et al. (1997).
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for mixed empirical results on technology spillovers obtained so far, since
the composition of FDI inflows varies between countries and even changes
through time as shown in Chapter 3.
5.3.2 Estimation
To examine the relationship between productivity of domestic firms and for-
eign presence in the same industry we follow the approach taken by the
previous literature and estimate different variations of the following equa-
tion:
∆lnYit = α+ β1∆lnKit + β2∆lnLit + β3∆lnSFOEit+
+β4∆lnV FDIit + β5∆lnV FDI(F )it+
+β6∆lnV FDI(B)it + βi + µi
(5.1)
In equation (5.1) Yit denotes the value added in the industry i in year
t.26 In contrast to previous literature we employ value added instead of total
output as dependent and inputs as explanatory variable in order to avoid
multicollinearity and gain degrees of freedom. On the right hand side, the
coefficient Kit is the value of total assets as a proxy for the employed capital.
Labour as the second input factor is captured by Lit, which stands for the
average number of employees in each industry and year. SFOEit measures
the share of foreign owned enterprises in industry i. It is defined as a share
of firms with foreign participation on the total sales in each industry, thus
incorporating the size and the role of foreign firms in the industry. Previous
studies employed different measurements of the foreign activity like the share
of assets or employment. However, here investment volume or employment
are not suited to measure the share of each FDI type, because in the em-
ployed cross section data set this information is available for the last year
only.
26Data sources and variable descriptions are provided in Table 5.6.
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V FDIit captures the share of vertical FDI on the total number of FDI
projects in industry i in year t.27 Vertical FDI is calculated as described in
the previous section. Additionally vertical FDI is split in two types in order
to test the effects of forward and backward vertical FDI, here V FDI(F )it
and V FDI(B)it respectively. Separate estimation of spillover effects for dif-
ferent types of investment allows not only to capture the effect of each FDI
type, but also different spillover channels, since they have different impacts
as shown in Table 5.5
As Djankov and Hoeckman (2000) pointed out, foreign investors tend to
acquire the largest and most successful companies in the host countries. We
avoid such a bias by estimating the productivity for the local firms only as
proposed by Smarzynska (2002).28 Following previous empirical studies on
FDI spillovers we employ OLS fixed effects as the estimation technique.29
Fixed effects are measured by industry dummies, thus controlling for indus-
try specific effects. We estimate the year to year changes in logarithmic forms
for each estimation variable with a panel data set of 23 sectors at ISIC two
digits level of the Czech manufacturing industry between 1995 and 1999.
27In contrast to other variables, the share of vertical FDI is computed for industry
sectors at the ISIC1 (one digit) level, since the low number of observation does not allow
to calculate the share for each year and industry at ISIC2 (two digit) level separately.
28Preliminary tests have shown that the share of greenfield FDI has a negative effect on
productivity of local firms. This surprisingly result can occur due to negative competition
effect, because greenfield investments are 2.5 times more productive than acquisition and
rule out local competitors.
29Djankov and Hoeckman (2000), Kinoshita (2000), and Smarzynska (2002) and several
prior studies employ this technique. Smarzinska (2002) also employs Olley and Pakes-
technique, which requires a high number of observations.
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5.3.3 Results
The estimation results are presented in Table 5.7, with OLS in the first three
and fixed effects estimation in the last three columns.30
In columns (1) and (4) we estimate the effects of foreign presence on pro-
ductivity of domestic firms in the same industry. The SFOE coefficient has
a negative sign, however it is not significant in both estimation techniques.
Controlling for the type of FDI shows a clearer picture: in all following speci-
fications with different FDI types SFOE is negative and significant. Thus, a
stronger presence of FOE in the industry reduces the productivity of domes-
tic firms in this industry (horizontal spillover). This result supports previous
findings for the Czech Republic by Djankov and Hoeckman (2000) who used
industry level instead of firm level data to estimate the spillover effect. The
negative effect of foreign presence occur due to several factors, discussed in
the previous section.
Now we turn to the coefficients of different FDI types. Coefficient V FDI
in columns (2) and (5) has a positive sign, thus the share of vertical FDI on
total foreign investment in the sector has a positive, while horizontal FDI
a negative effect on productivity of domestic firms. This result supports
the hypotheses from the previous section. Vertical FDI has several positive
channels for spillover, while the negative effects dominate in case of horizon-
tal investment, since this type of foreign affiliates compete with local firms
and thus reinforce the negative effects described above. Thus, in case of the
competition channel, the negative effects as acquiring the most productive
firms, crowding out competitiors and guarding own technology seems to over-
weight the positive effect of efforts toward higher competitiveness.
30Year dummies for each estimation does not change the result significantly and are
therefore not reported.
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As shown in the previous section, vertical FDI consists of two types of in-
vestments with export and host market orientation. They differ in particular
over the competition with local firms, what seems to play an important role
for technology spillover. Therefore, in columns (3) and (6) we control for for-
ward and backward vertical FDI separately. Export oriented backward FDI
has a positive and strong significant effect on the productivity of the domes-
tic firms in the same industry. Here, the positive effects of imitation, labour
turnover and knowledge of foreign markets seem to prevail. On the other
hand, host country oriented forward vertical FDI has a negative sign, sim-
ilar to the host market oriented horizontal FDI. However, it is not significant.
Different results for backward and forward vertical FDI point to the differ-
ent spillover channels concerned by each type of vertical investment. Besides
the channels that are common for all types of FDI, like imitation and labour
turnover, the main difference between backward and forward vertical FDI is
that the former involve the local supplier of input goods into the produc-
tion process to a much larger extent. The positive effect of backward VFDI
therefore is likely to be due to the larger share of inputs from local suppli-
ers. This points to the positive intra-industry (vertical) spillover effect, thus
confirming the findings of Smarzynska (2001) with the firm level data.
The results also give empirical support to the recently emerged idea,
that the ability to absorb the new technology plays an important role for
technology transfer.31 The estimation results show a negative impact of
horizontal FDI on spillover. But at the same time this type of investment
dominate between developed economies, where the total spillover effects of
FDI are significantly positive (Go¨rg and Greenway, 2001). Thus, the negative
effect in transition countries can be based on the low absorbing capacity of
domestic firms in these countries.
31See Borensztein et al. (1998) and Glass and Saggi (2002).
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In sum, foreign presence has a negative effect on the productivity of do-
mestic firms in the Czech Republic. This is in particular the case for horizon-
tal FDI. Among the vertical investments, backward export oriented FDI has
a strong positive, while host country oriented vertical FDI has no significant
effect.
5.4 Other Host Country Effects
Besides technology spillovers, the host economy earns benefit in several other
ways from foreign direct investments. Main direct effects would also include
the creation of employment in the host country, its integration in the world
economy through exports, an increase of local capital stock, a boost of lo-
cal R&D expenditures and finally the contribution to the tax income due to
higher profits and wages. The effects of foreign presence as a whole has been
empirically investigated and extensively summarised.32 Here, we distinguish
again between vertical and horizontal FDI in order to identify the differences
in characteristics between the two types with respect to the mentioned effects.
We start with the direct impact of multinationals on their Czech affiliates.
Foreign owned enterprises are a big employer in the Czech Republic, employ-
ing 26.9 percent of the labour force in manufacturing alone. Measured by
the total amount of employees in the Czech affiliates, backward vertical FDI
and horizontal FDI are similar, with 43.4 and 38.9 percent of all employees
with German affiliates in the Czech Republic respectively. Forward vertical
FDI plays a smaller role with 17.7 percent. As shown in Table 5.1, on the
firm level backward vertical affiliates are on average larger employers than
affiliates of other types of FDI, because they serve large foreign markets.
In addition vertical FDI is more often a pure job creator, since more than
70 percent of vertical FDI projects are greenfield investments. In contrast,
32see Lipsey (2002), UNCTAD (1999) for the overview of empirical evidence and Moran
(1998) and Protsenko et al. (2001) for discussion of positive and negative effects.
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horizontal investments acquire in every second case an existing enterprise,
which often involves lay offs in the starting stage due to optimisation process
of former state enterprises. Thus, from the employment perspective, vertical
FDI is more attractive for the host economy.
Second, FDI contributes to the host economy by transferring significant
amounts of capital to own affiliates in the host country (Marin et al., 2002).
As shown in Section 2, horizontal investments are in total much larger than
vertical one. However, excluding one large investment project in the auto-
motive sector make export oriented vertical FDI on average larger than the
horizontal. Thus, both types contribute significantly to the investment stock
in the Czech Republic.
Third, FDI is treated to be boosting export competitiveness and to en-
hance the economic integration of the host country into world economy. In-
deed, FOE contribute 60.5 percent to manufacturing exports from the Czech
Republic.33 Here, the vertical FDI is doubtless the driving force behind for-
eign trade of the Czech economy.34 As expected, backward vertical FDI is
strongly export oriented, achieving an average export share of 68.3 percent
from total sales. At the same time forward vertical FDI imports more than
80 percent of its inputs. Thus, both types of vertical FDI contribute to an
increase of foreign trade. On the other side, theoretical literature see hori-
zontal FDI to be trade reducing, since the foreign market is served by local
production instead of exports (Brainard, 1993, and Markusen and Venables,
2000). This theoretical result is supported by the data for the Czech Repub-
lic, where this type of FDI has an export share of 18.5 percent and obtains
more than 70 percent of inputs locally.
33Manufacturing sector in 1999, Czech Statistical Office (2001).
34The results however depends essentially on the definition of horizontal FDI. For ex-
ample Lankes and Venables (1997) calls the FDI horizontal if 100 percent of the output is
sold locally. For further discussion see Chapter 4.
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Fourth, from the perspective of the host government, foreign investors
are an essential source of taxes from profits and wages. Empirical evidence
is eminent, that foreign affiliates pay substantially higher wages than local
firms in the same industry, increasing the welfare and contributing to higher
local consumption and higher tax income (Lipsey and Sjoholm, 2003). Less
clear is the situation with the profits. According to the Czech Statistical
Office (2001), foreign firms in all manufacturing industries on average have
been profitable between 1996 to 1999. In the same period of time, domes-
tic firms in total have been making losses in almost all industries.35 This
result has two implications. First, foreign firms contribute substantially to
the tax income from firm profits, even if they have more opportunities for
profit shifting then their local counterparts. In particular vertical FDI has
a better opportunity for profit shifting through intra-firm trade. Second,
one of the reason for losses of domestic firms is fierce competition from the
more productive foreign firms. Thus, horizontal firms have less profit shift-
ing possibilities, but they can reduce tax revenues by lowering the profits
of domestic firms. Therefore, the difference in tax revenues by vertical and
horizontal FDI is less clear.
Finally, there are several indirect effects of foreign direct investments for
the local consumers. For example horizontal FDI increases product variety
in the host country and intensifies local competition, so local consumers can
benefit from better choice opportunity and lower prices. However, as some
studies argue, foreign firms can also decrease competition and drive out local
competitors.36
35It is not clear, whether the losses of domestic firms are the consequence of the compe-
tition pressure from FOE or for other reasons, like better knowledge of local tax system.
36Harrison (1996).
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5.5 Conclusion
The fact that foreign investments bring great benefits to the host country is
well established. In this chapter we explored the question, whether the same
can be told about different types of FDI, namely for vertical and horizontal
FDI. The governments worldwide often tend to be in favour of horizontal,
host market oriented investments. The results of this chapter clearly show,
that this perception is not reasonable. Vertical investment contribute posi-
tively to the local economy at least as well, and in several fields like technology
spillovers or export orientation even much stronger than horizontal FDI.
In order to evaluate the different impacts this chapter combines the data
on vertical and horizontal FDI from the survey of German Investors and
official statistics about the productivity of foreign and domestic firms in the
Czech Republic between 1995 and 1999.
For the first time the main characteristics and distribution of vertical and
horizontal FDI within a host country have been described empirically. The
largest share of German FDI is going into the manufacturing sector, while
vertical FDI is concentrated in machinery and metal manufacturing and hor-
izontal one in the food sector and publishing. Within the manufacturing
sector, about 30 percent of all FDI are “outsourcing” investments, when the
Czech production is an intermediate stage of the production abroad. This
type of FDI has only 14 percent of German FDI in the Czech Republic.
The host market benefits in several ways from foreign owned firms. The
effects of capital and technology transfer by multinationals to the own affil-
iates in the host country are beyond doubt positive and contributed to the
successful restructuring of the Czech economy, as pointed out by previous
research. The effect on domestic firms is less clear. Empirical results of
this chapter show that in one of the most important impact channels, the
technology spillover, foreign owned enterprises as a whole have a negative
effect on the productivity of domestic firms in the same industry. This is in
particular true for horizontal host market oriented FDI. The negative result
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could be due to fierce competition and privatisation of the most productive
domestic firms. To the contrary, vertical export oriented investments have
a significant and positive effect on the productivity of domestic firms. They
do not compete with domestic firms for local consumers, however remain a
source for spillovers through information about foreign markets, imitation
and labour turnover. Measured by other effects on the local economy, verti-
cal FDI appears to be at least as attractive as horizontal FDI. Vertical FDI
is better for the host economy in fields of technology, R&D expenditures,
employment and integration in the world economy.
Thus, the results dispel the concerns, that host market oriented FDI has
the best positive impact on the host country. However, further analysis is
necessary to look at the firm level evidence of the vertical and horizontal FDI
over a longer period of time. Comparisons with other countries will also give
additional insights into distributional patterns and impacts of vertical and
horizontal FDI.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion: Summary of
Results and Outlook
The world economy experienced a dramatic increase in foreign direct invest-
ment (FDI) and multinational activities over the last decade. Explaining
this process, previous literature seemed to have overlook the different types
of FDI, in particular when analysing the composition of investment flows and
the effects of FDI on host and home countries. Starting from this point, this
thesis differentiated between two major groups of foreign direct investment:
vertical and horizontal FDI.
Vertical FDI occurs, when a multinational enterprise separates its produc-
tion chain geographically, while horizontal FDI takes place, when the same
production process is duplicated in a foreign country. Based on this differen-
tiation the contribution of the thesis is twofold: it explores the composition
of FDI flows in transition countries over time and analyses the impact of
vertical and horizontal FDI on home and host countries. In particular, it
provides the first empirical evidence for vertical and horizontal FDI in tran-
sition countries of Central and Eastern Europe. This chapter summarises
the major findings and gives a short outlook for the further research.
Lack of empirical data was one of the major shortcomings for study-
ing vertical and horizontal FDI. Therefore, the empirical part of the thesis is
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based on a unique firm level data set collected by the author and his colleages
from the Chair of International Economics, University of Munich. The data
set covers up to 80 percent of German investment projects in Central and
Eastern Europe. Information on intra-firm trade between parent and affil-
iate company provides the possibility to differentiate between vertical and
horizontal FDI and to conduct the analysis for each type of FDI separately.
In the first step, Chapter 2 gave an overview of the literature on vertical
and horizontal FDI. The survey made clear that, so far, related theoret-
ical literature explained only the appearance and determinants of vertical
and horizontal FDI. However, the question of impacts for each FDI type re-
mained open. The overview of prior empirical studies illustrated a strong
empirical support for models of horizontal FDI and showed that the theories
of vertical FDI found empirical support only recently. Recent evidence for
vertical FDI is based on three reasons: an increasing role of vertical FDI in
the 1990s, improved estimation techniques and new detailed data sets.
Under the term “FDI Life Cycle” Chapter 3 explored how the pattern
of FDI inflows into transition countries changed over time. The theoreti-
cal model developed in this chapter argued that FDI inflows affect the host
country characteristics and, in turn, the changes of host country character-
istics influence the composition of FDI flows. Thus, the results explain why
we should observe a changing pattern of FDI inflows during the catching-up
process in transition countries: Vertical cost seeking FDI dominates in the
beginning of the transition process in order to exploit low factor prices, while
the share of horizontal FDI increases over time, as the market becomes larger
and higher factor prices drive out vertical FDI. In the second step, Chapter
3 provided empirical evidence for the changing composition of FDI inflows to
Central and Eastern Europe. The main observation was the falling share of
vertical FDI on total German FDI inflows in CEE since middle of the 1990s,
while the share of horizontal FDI increased. This is a clear evidence for
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the “FDI Life Cycle”, since the host countries experienced increasing labour
costs and growing market size in this period of time. In particular, estimation
results indicated a negative relationship between the share of vertical FDI in
total FDI inflows and difference in production costs as well as the size of the
foreign market.
Chapters 4 and 5 argued that vertical and horizontal FDI have different
impacts on the home and host countries of multinational enterprise. Chap-
ter 4 illustrated theoretically and empirically, that vertical FDI leads to a
complementary relationship of labour demand between different affiliates of
multinational enterprise. For example, a wage increase in a CEE affiliate
leads to lower labour demand in the parent company in Germany. In case of
horizontal FDI there is no such marginal relationship between different loca-
tions, since affiliates produce the same goods and the production processes
are not interconnected. In order to analyse the impacts of vertical and hori-
zontal FDI, Chapter 4 also developed three alternative ways to identify each
type of investment from the firm level data. These three approaches were
used to estimate the labour demand function of the multinational enterprise.
The outcome was a clear evidence for complementarity in labour demand for
vertical FDI, while there was no significant relationship for horizontal FDI
with respect to wages in other locations. Estimation results also pointed to
some substitutional features for both types of FDI, since increasing sales in
Central and Eastern Europe lead to lower labour demand in Germany. The
findings provide a refinement of previous literature on FDI employment ef-
fects, because the total effect between two countries depends significantly on
the composition of FDI flows between them.
Chapter 5 explored the impacts of vertical and horizontal FDI on a host
transition country. The main focus was on technology spillovers from foreign
to local firms, however, other differences between the two types of FDI like
technology and employment were also considered. Using data for the Czech
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manufacturing sector Chapter 5 showed that vertical and horizontal FDI gen-
erate different technology spillover effects from foreign affiliates to domestic
firms. Employing spillover channels like knowledge about export markets or
labour turnover, vertical export oriented FDI has a positive impact on the
productivity of local firms. Horizontal market seeking FDI exploits other
spillover channels, like competition or imitation, and exercises a negative ef-
fect on domestic firms. Such contradictory result adds a new perspective to
the explanation of inconsistent results from the previous literature on FDI
spillover effects, since different investment types dominate in FDI flows to
different countries. The estimation results also showed that a larger share of
foreign firms in an industry has a negative effect on the productivity of local
firms in the same industry. Besides the spillover effects, Chapter 5 explored
the patterns of vertical and horizontal FDI in a host country, which is the
first empirical attempt to analyse the distribution and the time pattern of
vertical and horizontal FDI. The empirical findings widely support theoreti-
cal predictions that vertical FDI are more labour intensive than horizontal,
while horizontal FDI takes place in industries with high transportation costs.
In sum, taking different characteristics and effects into account, vertical FDI
have a stronger positive effect on the host economy than horizontal FDI.
This thesis is the first step in the empirical analysis of impacts and roles
of vertical and horizontal FDI. It emphasizes the necessity to distinguish be-
tween different investment types when analysing the effects of FDI. However,
further research on vertical and horizontal FDI is necessary in the fields of
growth, trade and agglomeration effects. These topics are already well dis-
cussed for FDI as a whole but are still widely unexplored for different types
of investment flows.
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